Author: Institute for Carbon Removal Law and Policy

Two opposing mega-trends are highlighted by the IPCC Working Group III report, one a cause for grave alarm, one a cause for hope. This report finds we are currently heading very fast towards global warming of 1.5°C. And the current pledges by countries would take us significantly well beyond the 1.5°C target. 

A major takeaways from this report indicate that we must dramatically phase down fossil fuels and stop new fossil-fuel infrastructure.  However, at the same time as we phase down fossil fuels, the IPCC report finds that carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is required to counterbalance hard-to-abate sectors of the economy and to limit warming to 1.5°C. The IPCC report affirms that carbon removal is especially important to counterbalance hard-to-abate sectors, like steel production and long-haul aviation. 

For a more extensive look into the finding of this report, please see our “Key Findings for Carbon Dioxide Removal.”

Here is a summary of some key points:

The IPCC Working Group III report affirms that carbon removal will be critical to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement, in tandem with deep cuts to emissions, and highlights the scaling that needs to happen to realize this goal. 

• CDR can counterbalance hard-to-abate sectors: The report finds that CDR has an important role to play in reaching net-zero emissions by counterbalancing residual emissions in sectors of the economy like food production, long-haul aviation, and steel production (C.11.4). CDR is required both globally and nationally (Technical Summary, page 94).
• Carbon removal cannot be an excuse to overshoot 1.5: The Working Group II report found that scenarios that significantly overshoot 1.5°C, including ones where large-scale CDR is used, bring catastrophic costs and other risks. The Working Group III report acknowledges the current limitations of CDR as well as the risks and impacts (C.11.2; C.11.5), stating that upscaling the deployment of CDR at very large scales depends on developing approaches to address feasibility and sustainability (C.11).
• Responsible deployment is key: The report warns that poorly done CDR can have varying socio-economic side effects, depending on the method, site-specific content, implementation, and scale of CDR deployment (C.11.2). As a result, it is crucial to responsibly scale-up CDR. 
• Multiple CDR solutions can work in tandem with one another: The report does not make a recommendation on which CDR approach is best. The estimates of carbon removal available from each CDR approach vary in the report. In addition, all approaches have limits and trade-offs. The report finds that CDR in the land sector alone presents challenges for competing demands on food security, conflicts with livelihoods, and the nuances of land ownership and management systems (C.9). The report finds that regarding mitigation generally, a broad portfolio is best and that portfolios of technological solutions reduce feasibility risks (Technical Summary, page 138) In this light, investing in multiple CDR approaches may be required to reach the gigaton scale of removal needed. This portfolio of options includes technological approaches like Direct Air Capture, which requires significantly less land area than nature-based solutions.   
• Carbon removal is distinct from carbon capture: The IPCC places CDR and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) in two distinct sections of the report. The terms often get conflated. CDR and CCS are two diverse approaches to climate mitigation that use similar and overlapping vocabulary but undertake very different activities, often with radically different approaches. Carbon removal can address legacy emissions, which makes it a unique tool for meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement. Conversely, CCS stops carbon dioxide before it gets into the atmosphere. 
• Scaling up CDR is crucial: The report finds that scaling up CDR responsibly requires accelerated research and development, improved tools for risk assessment and management, targeted incentives, the development of agreed methods for measurement, and robust reporting and verification of carbon flows (C.11.5). Modeling in the report does not fully account for the falling costs of CDR, but general economic cost forecasts by prior IPCC reports failed to fully capture cost reductions that subsequently occurred for solar and wind power (Technical Summary, page 25). The report finds that modular small-scale technologies tend to improve faster and be adopted more quickly – a technological profile that may match DAC units (Technical Summary, page 25). 

It is critical to responsibly scale up carbon removal to removal in order to balance the carbon budget and limit warming at 1.5°C.

• The world is close to exceeding its carbon budget: A significant but very small carbon budget remains to limit warming to 1.5° and the path to limit warming to 1.5° is extremely narrow. Pollution from hard-to-decarbonize sectors must be counterbalanced.
• Carbon removal is needed to help close the gap: Carbon removal, which can counterbalance emissions in hard-to-abate sectors, with nature-based and technological solutions, can help ensure the world does not exceed its carbon budget if (and only if) it is paired with aggressive pollution reduction.  
• We need to embrace all climate solutions: As the world gets close to exceeding our carbon budget, there is no silver bullet to solve the climate crisis. We need to double down on urgently reducing new climate pollution. This can happen in tandem with carbon removal and other climate technologies. Investing in carbon removal today can help answer questions on responsible carbon removal deployment, such as how to reduce costs and ensure that projects are developed with community input.

Authored by Jenn Brown

Prepared for the Institute for Carbon Removal Law and Policy

The term “pipeline” tends to evoke strong reactions throughout many communities across the U.S. for various reasons. Many of these reactions are negative, and these feelings are not without merit. This concern around pipelines also expands beyond U.S. impacts as well, as the expansion of many pipelines is concomitant with the perpetuation of the fossil fuel industry.

In the United States, there are 2.8 million miles of regulated pipelines that carry oil, refined products, and natural gas liquids. These massive pipeline infrastructures have posed significant threats and damages to communities and environments throughout the country, and some of this can be attributed to aging infrastructure. For example, according to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, from 2001 to 2020, there have been 5,750 significant pipeline incidents onshore and offshore, resulting in over $10.7 billion worth of damages.^[1]

This brings us to the issue at hand: how do pipelines that transport CO₂ for both carbon dioxide removal and carbon capture utilization and storage fit into this picture?

It has become increasingly clear in recent years that carbon dioxide removal (CDR) will become a necessity for the global community to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. The recent IPCC AR6 Working Group I report released in August of 2021 reiterates this point. Even with the most optimistic modeling used in the report, limiting warming to 1.5˚C necessitates about 5 billion tons of carbon dioxide removal per year by mid-century and 17 billion by 2100. Some approaches to CDR might involve transporting CO₂ via pipelines, but there are also many other approaches that do not necessitate the need for pipelines, such as enhanced weathering, agroforestry, and blue carbon.

One method of carbon removal that has received a fair amount of attention is direct air capture (DAC) in part due to the recently launched Orca facility in Iceland by Swiss company Climeworks. Furthermore, the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act passed in 2021 includes $3.5 billion allocated to the construction of four “regional direct air capture hubs” and additional funding for CO₂ pipelines.  This effort is made with high hopes from the federal government that these hubs will result in the creation of clean energy jobs.

The carbon removed with DAC can be injected into the ground right at the plant where the carbon removal takes place, as long as the facility is located over appropriate geological formations. This is an idea known as colocation, which prevents the need for transporting CO₂ altogether. But DAC could also possibly, to some degree, come to rely on the utilization of pipelines to transport the captured CO₂  to sites where it can be injected into geological storage areas, or to facilities where it can be transformed into long-lasting carbontech products such as concrete.

These developments conjure an important question: are all pipelines created equal? Furthermore, does a CO₂ pipeline intended for combating climate change warrant the same concern as oil and gas pipelines? Are pipelines needed to scale DAC or can CO₂ storage happen onsite at a DAC plant?

As a starting point to help navigate this thorny and complex question, we turned to the expertise of three professionals working actively on these exact issues. Through these discussions, we sought out perspectives from the “yes,” “no,” and “maybe” stances on if the scaling of DAC depends on CO₂ pipelines. As these viewpoints highlight, there is a range of perspectives when it comes to if the growth of DAC is reliant on CO₂ pipelines or not.

The Experts

Xan Fishman, who is representing the “yes” perspective, is currently the Director of Energy Policy and Carbon Management at the Bipartisan Policy Center. Fishman previously worked for Congressman John Delaney as Chief of Staff. Through this experience, he became interested in DAC as a way of simultaneously addressing climate change and investing in various communities to create jobs, particularly in the Midwest.

Celina Scott-Buechler, who represents the “no” perspective, is a Climate Innovation Fellow at Data for Progress. Scott-Buechler’s work with the organization is on looking at how large-scale carbon removal can work in tandem with decarbonization in the U.S. Her work is also focused on promoting job creation and working alongside the environmental justice community to ensure these efforts do not fall into the traps of past infrastructure projects that did not have community support. She also served in the office of Senator Cory Booker through a one-year fellowship term working on natural climate solutions.

Rory Jacobson, who represents the “maybe” perspective, is Deputy Director of Policy at Carbon180, a D.C.-based NGO focused exclusively on carbon removal federal policy. Jacobson has spent the majority of his career focused on CDR, most recently at Natural Resources Defense Council researching near-term federal policies to incentivize deployment. As a graduate student at Yale, he advised Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry on myriad climate and energy issues.

What differentiates a CO₂ pipeline from other types of pipelines?

Fishman points to the fact that much of the opposition to existing pipelines, particularly oil and gas, derives from the risk of spills and the implications that has for communities and the environment. Additionally, this perception is influenced by what the pipeline is transporting, which in the case of oil and gas is related directly to climate change via the resulting emissions that will cause further harm to communities and the larger environment. On the other hand, CO₂  pipelines are part of the climate solution. Although careful consideration should be taken when siting pipelines, implementing safety precautions and regulations, CO₂ pipelines are generally safe and do not carry hazardous waste, according to Fishman.

Scott-Buechler feels that how the public views these issues matters, and that pipelines, in general, have had very negative image “in particular because of the way these pipelines have been sited through indigenous lands without consultation, though environmental justice communities and other rural communities without consent, minimal consent, or at least with minimal information.” Due to this, combined with other prominent issues for many groups, especially within the environmental justice community, the idea of a pipeline is a nonstarter because of all the baggage it carries.

Jacobson points to the more technical aspects on top of important questions around equity and justice. “From an infrastructure and engineering perspective they (CO₂ pipelines)are actually quite different from oil and gas pipelines, and this difference is quite important because we actually do not transport CO₂  as a gas. We transport it as a supercritical fluid which means that the carbon dioxide is under such high pressures that it actually behaves like a liquid.” CO₂ needs to be transported at 700 PSI higher than, for example, natural gas, meaning the pipeline walls have to be thicker than other types of pipelines. This also indicates that the repurposing of decommissioned oil and gas pipelines, although in some cases could be considered ideal, is not a feasible option. Even in instances in which engineering is perfectly compliant with regulation, past missteps nonetheless highlight the inadequacy of federal review for existing pipelines, and the need for greater oversight.

Are CO₂ Pipelines Necessary for Scaling Direct Air Capture?

“The way that I think about direct air capture is that it is nascent. But to go from where we are right now to the scale we need to be a major factor in achieving net-zero, there is a long way to go…In general, the faster we are able to deploy, the faster we will be able to scale,” says Fishman. Additionally, he makes the point that in order to meet 2050 climate goals, it is more beneficial to begin scaling now versus 5-10 years from now. He also points to the fact that there are already 5,000 miles of CO₂  pipelines currently in existence in the US. The 2020 Princeton University report Net-Zero America: Potential Pathways, Infrastructure, and Impacts has indicated significantly more pipeline infrastructure will be needed to achieve climate goals.^[2] Furthermore, storage requires investment. Currently, DAC facilities are not yet at scale to bring in massive amounts of carbon dioxide and will probably not be for some time. Therefore, there is likely not enough  CO₂ being brought in by DAC technologies as of yet to warrant large investments into storage. However, there are many existing industrial sites utilizing carbon capture utilization and storage, and connecting those sites to existing sinks for sequestration requires pipelines. Sharing lines of transportation across sectors increases the likelihood that each of those industries will be able to get off the ground without having to build something from scratch. Fisherman argues that this makes economic sense and will assist in the overall success of DAC in the long run.

Scott-Buechler argues that more information is needed around how to make pipelines safer and better regulated, especially including community input. Furthermore, pipelines are likely to be a huge sticking point within many communities, therefore she predicts potential 5-10 year delays in CO₂ pipeline rollout given the problematic history of other types of pipelines in the US. In looking at it through this lens, co-locations with DAC facilities will be key to deploying the technology (which is injecting CO2 captured from a DAC facility right where the DAC plant is located, such as the Orca plant in Iceland). She further points to the fact that there are enough opportunities for co-location and many other ways for the industry to consider storage in more creative terms. Therefore, Scott-Buechler makes the case that it is feasible to severely limit the number of pipelines needed to scale DAC.

Jacobson argues for the creation of a comprehensive task force responsible for building out both the geography and the safety standards required to ensure best practices. This entity would consider everything from pipelines to siting to public engagement, including designating appropriate locations for these pipelines with rich public engagement and consent, examining the construction, quality, and surrounding ecosystem of pipelines, and setting safety parameters for operation. Thoughtful planning of pipeline networks can help both limit the number of pipelines and the distances to which they transport CO₂ from DAC projects. This is especially relevant in light of increased funding for carbon removal that we’re seeing in upcoming legislation and federal funding. In implementing projects such as the four regional DAC hubs included in the recent bipartisan infrastructure deal, federal agencies like the DOE can set the tone for future deployment, safeguards, and community engagement.

What are the factors behind these viewpoints?

Fishman takes into consideration the threat of climate change and looking at the IPCC’s recommendation for the removal of 5-10 gigatons of CO₂ per year. “It’s not just about getting to net-zero, it’s about getting to net negative,” he says. There is also the possibility the global community will achieve collective climate goals later than needed, which will further increase the need for removals. In terms of looking at CO₂  pipelines, he points out that other modes of transporting CO₂  as an alternative come with their own set of complications, such as additional emissions. “The stakes are so high that not investing in a solution that it turns out we need, and it is fairly obvious as a potential path right now, I think would be a terrible mistake…There is an extent to which we built our way into this problem (climate change), and the real solution available to us is to build our way out of it,” he says. But the key is ensuring these solutions are built the right way,  while also taking into consideration any environmental justice concerns.

Scott-Buechler has worked closely with environmental justice groups for quite some time, both on and off Capitol Hill, and has come to view issues around carbon removal through that lens. She indicates that potential leakage is a large factor behind the mistrust, and sees pipelines as a nonstarter with these groups. She points to Standing Rock, stating “pipelines at large have developed this larger than life personality when talking about carbon removal infrastructure…generally siting and permitting will be something that we as a carbon removal community will contend with.” She also points to the DAC hubs laid out within the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, arguing that these hubs need to prioritize development in communities, led by those communities and other public groups rather than private industry, especially in communities transitioning away from economic reliance on fossil fuel industries. Further, researchers and policy communities should focus funds in these areas to fill existing gaps in information.

Jacobson explains that equitable construction, development, and input are critical to communities that would potentially host these projects, and that thoughtful quantitative analysis can better articulate the need for if and how much DAC needs CO₂ pipeline infrastructure. Other types of pipelines have resulted in infringement on tribal sovereignty and other disasters, and Jacobson says that resistance to pipelines comes for a good reason. “These groups have already bared the environmental injustice that the oil industry and natural gas sector have placed on them, and accordingly, we would like to not have another pipeline of risk in their community and backyard. That is completely understandable.” He makes the case that strong federal regulation paired with public engagement and science-based communication with the communities is the only path forward. Additionally, Rory acknowledged that there is likely to be a lot of resistance from wealthy and privileged communities not wanting to see these pipelines in their backyard, and likely have more resources than lower-income communities to push back — something that should also be considered and remedied in policy and process.

[1] Depending on the type of pipeline, what it is transferring, what it is made of, and where it runs, there are various federal or state agencies that have jurisdiction over its regulatory affairs. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission oversees Interstate pipelines. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration oversees, develops, and enforces regulations to ensure the safe and environmentally sound pipeline transportation system. The United States Army Corps of Engineers oversees pipelines constructed through navigable bodies of water, including wetlands. State environmental regulatory agencies are also involved when it comes to pipelines that run through waterways.

[2] 21,000 to 25,000 km interstate CO₂ trunk pipeline network and 85,000 km of spur pipelines delivering CO₂ to trunk lines.

Authored by David Morrow & Michael Thompson

Prepared for the Institute for Carbon Removal Law and Policy

Earlier this week, the Swiss company Climeworks fired up its new Orca direct air capture facility in Iceland, which will remove 4,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide (CO₂) per year and turn it into stone.

Obviously, 4,000 metric tons is a tiny drop in the bucket compared to today’s emissions. Each year, Orca will clean up about three seconds’ worth of global CO₂ emissions at today’s rates.

But that’s not the point. Orca is a baby step toward a larger carbon removal industry that could one day clean up emissions from the hardest-to-abate sectors or, even better, start cleaning up “legacy carbon” that remains in the atmosphere from our past emissions. Without baby steps like Orca, though, we would never get there. In that respect, Orca is a bit like the tiny, 3.5 kilowatt solar power station that NASA’s Lewis Research Center installed on the Papago Indian Reservation in 1978; it’s only the beginning. Global solar power capacity now stands at more than 200 million times the capacity of that little installation. While direct air capture isn’t likely to grow at such a pace, the point is that we shouldn’t judge the potential of an industry by its output in its earliest days.

One reason that direct air capture won’t grow at the same pace as solar power is because solar panels provide energy, whereas direct air capture consumes it. So, at least for the next couple of decades, it will almost always make more sense, from the perspective of climate change mitigation  and energy justice, to spend money on installing more clean energy and replacing old fossil fuel infrastructure than on building more direct air capture facilities. The reason to spend some money on direct air capture now, though, is to help the technology grow so that once we’ve drastically reduced our emissions, we can use direct air capture and other approaches to carbon removal to get to net-zero and maybe even net-negative emissions. By analogy, four decades ago, the reason to spend money on solar panels was not because they offered a cost-effective way of reducing emissions or supplying energy, but because those investments helped the technology grow. If everyone had dismissed solar at the time as too small and too expensive, we wouldn’t have the solar industry that we do today.

At any rate, one of the compelling things about Orca is that it’s running on renewable geothermal energy that was basically stranded in Iceland. Because Iceland already runs almost entirely on renewables, the clean energy that Orca uses couldn’t easily have been used to displace dirty energy instead. (Arguably, one could have instead built a facility to produce green hydrogen to ship to Europe or North America, but again, the point of Orca isn’t to reduce emissions today but to help build a technology that will be useful in the future. Besides, there’s plenty of renewable energy to go around in Iceland, so why not both? Build a hydrogen plant there, too!)

Another compelling thing about Orca is that it sits atop the perfect geology for mineralizing CO₂. Orca can inject its captured CO₂ directly into basalt, where it will turn to stone in a matter of years. 

The combination of abundant, stranded clean energy and good geology for sequestration makes Iceland an ideal place to build early direct air capture facilities—which raises an interesting question: where else in the world can we find that combination?

Authored by Isabella Corpora, Research Fellow, Institute for Carbon Removal Law and Policy

Prepared for the Institute for Carbon Removal Law and Policy.

Accounts of climate futures typically advance a Northern perspective. Individuals and communities in the Global South are too often portrayed solely as victims of a changing climate, rather than as active participants in the crafting of climate responses. In his new book, The Ministry for the Future, speculative fiction writer Kim Stanley Robinson presents a picture of what the near future could look like, with the Global South on the frontlines not just of climate impacts but of climate action. A world is depicted in which an international subsidiary body, created out of the Paris Agreement, attempts to ride and direct this climate rollercoaster. The novel reviews potential impacts of climate change and how strife, economics, and human ingenuity and perseverance go hand in hand. Along with global governance, Robinson evaluates, among many other things, carbon drawdown techniques and the creation of a “carbon currency” as methods to make change. 

On March 23rd, 2021 Robinson joined ICRLP in a recent webinar to discuss his book alongside Olufemi Taiwo, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University and a Research Fellow with ICRLP, and Kate O’Neill, Associate Professor of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management at UC Berkeley as the session’s moderator. Taiwo looks at issues of environmental justice using the tools and perspectives of political philosophy with a specific carbon removal twist. The discussion over the course of the webinar ranged from climate governance to shifting economic systems and why environmental justice considerations must be held paramount. 

Common but differentiated responsibilities

The Ministry for the Future opens in a near-future India in the midst of a climate change-induced catastrophe. The event and its aftermath drive, in the novel, a set of actions building from and strengthening the Paris Agreement.

During the webinar, Robinson and Taiwo considered the prospects of the Paris Agreement as a global pact to address a warming planet. The idea of “common but differentiated responsibilities” has come out of the international climate response regime as a recognition that developed countries have polluted the most throughout history, therefore should bear more of the responsibility for addressing climate change, such as with increased funding. Taiwo’s work evaluates this from a political philosophy stance, reviewing what he described as “distributive mechanisms and issues of justice”. He suggested that it’s not just present-day carbon pollution that is at the heart of differentiated responsibilities and impacts. Both colonization and the Industrial Revolution have had inequitable effects on developing countries, physically from emissions but also societally. These today have transpired as divisions between the Global “North” and “South”.

With this comes recognition of “climate colonialism”, an acknowledgment that developed countries continue to pollute at the expense of developing countries. Moral dilemmas and difficult tradeoffs arise in the efforts to avert climate disasters, made particularly acute in Robinson’s novel when carbon removal and solar radiation management methods come into play. A theme in the conversation between Robinson and Taiwo was, who is to say what types of technology can or cannot be implemented by Global South populations when attempting to combat an issue they didn’t create? In Robinson’s book, this complex set of social and political choices is represented by India’s unilateral use of SRM technology. In real life this is, among other things, exemplified by the Green Climate Fund, which has had a $200 billion target to allocate for green development goals yet is currently operating around $10 billion. Though western countries are attempting to remedy their climate mistakes, they aren’t as forceful or consistent with their promises, and it is the South that will bear the brunt of these shortcomings. 

Governance

Moderator O’Neill asked the speakers what kinds of geopolitical changes are needed to make a fairer system. 

The speakers reviewed how updated policy and global governance could help address these issues, and discussed ways policy can be shaped from a scientifically backed rather than politicizing perspective. When it comes to carbon removal, the speakers suggested that the discussion should be regarding just usage of the technology. As Taiwo pointed out, even governance structures can be looked at as technologies. The conversation pivoted to forms of governance that emphasize local participation, with the discussion of “community control” through a “citizens assembly” where experts describe issues to the people and they can make an informed decision on how to address the problem, mitigating decisions made solely by a select few corporations and their executives and shareholders. Taiwo also described privatization as a governance structure, pointing out that a social budgetary decision-making system could instead be formed with “participatory budgeting” where the public decides more directly what programs funding goes towards. 

Robinson offered a related but different view on the question of markets acting as governance. Recognition was made that the problem of climate change is already quickly unfolding before us, therefore market mechanisms, or a shift back towards Keynesian economics and emphasis on financial institutions, could do the job faster than a reconfiguring of the capitalist order. A “pairing” of issues could help with this, such as development with regenerative agriculture that could simultaneously have carbon removal aspects such as biochar or soil carbon sequestration. 

This brought about a larger discussion between Robinson and Taiwo: how does one make a radical shift of economics in their current economy, and who chooses? Much of the North, currently operating from capitalist or hybrid systems, is continuing to abuse the environment through engrained market mechanisms. Not is but what radical change is needed to save us from this mass extinction event? How does one come about implementing a new economic system in one that, normatively speaking, is already functioning? How desperate does the system need to become in order for change to be made? At this point in the webinar, Robinson postulated whether westernization and modernization are all simply “capitalism”, and if modernization can occur without capitalism. Taiwo believes it can. 

The future, semi-based on the response to COVID

These are big questions. Yet, Taiwo reminded us that humanity has already experienced any number of civilization-shaping social shifts. Colonialism affected lives and physical environments around the world. Oil companies have already reorganized the coastline of Louisiana to build refineries. Adverse impacts for a portion of humanity are nothing new. A similar point, noted the speakers, can be made about technological interventions in Earth systems. Humans have already engineered the climate through carbon emissions; carbon removal options might be thought of as a way of engineering out of what has actually been done for almost the past two hundred years. Taiwo and Robinson described how we are “aestheticizing” the climate issue rather than using the tools we currently have to handle it: we evaluate issues of justice that can arise, but with inaction, actually exacerbate those problems. Thus, a radical shift needs to be made, and it needs to be made in the next ten years.  

When asked about the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic and how the quarantine has affected emissions, both Robinson and Taiwo seemed on the same page. Vaccine distribution globally has been fairly inequitable, and the consequences for the rest of the world will backfire on the United States. This is similar to the climate crisis response, and where western countries occupy positions of power in global markets and political systems, their less egalitarian response will adversely affect them. Until social battles are met and reckoned with, we won’t be able to address the issue from the right framework. It’s going to take an assessment of the social systems and values of the North and the South to see the tools we have to generate change in a climate-altered world, and for consideration of the kinds of collective futures we want, or need, to build. 

Watch the entire webinar here.

Robinson and Táíwò responded in writing to participant questions that could not be answered during the event. To see questions and responses, click here.

Authored by Isabella Corpora, Research Fellow, Institute for Carbon Removal Law and Policy

Prepared for the Institute for Carbon Removal Law and Policy

A variety of igneous rocks and minerals are currently under evaluation as potential prospects to facilitate permanent carbon sequestration. Olivine, serpentine, and peridotite are some of the many that bind with carbon dioxide to form carbonates, hence providing a more permanent removal of captured carbon. This post is about a rock that deserves more attention: basalt.

Basalt is an igneous rock that is widely abundant globally and can bind to carbon dioxide more quickly than other options. Different forms of basalt stand as serious contenders for large-scale subsurface or in situ mineral carbonation, so why are they not a hotter topic in the carbon removal world? 

To set this up, there are distinct rocks used for removing versus storing carbon. Those evaluated to capture carbon can do so through the process of enhanced weathering. Enhanced weathering is usually completed on surface levels, such as with the mineral olivine that binds with ambient carbon dioxide along seashores. For storage purposes, rocks can be evaluated based on their presence in different layers below Earth’s crust. For both processes, the process of mineralization can occur where silicate materials and gases, like carbon dioxide, bind to form products like carbonates. Basalt is usually viewed for its storage potential. Carbon dioxide would need to first be captured through other technological processes and then injected into a basalt aquifer for carbonation. Though there is potential for basalt to be used for enhanced weathering purposes, the emphasis through this post will be on in situ storage.  

Changing atmospheric carbon dioxide into rocks is a complex chemistry trick. The ability of a rock to function as a carbon-storer is a function of surface porosity levels, gaseous pressure requirements, and temperature levels, among other factors. Some minerals, including wollastonite, tend to be less available in nature and have stricter requirements needed for successful carbonation to occur. Basalt, however, provides us a unique opportunity due to its scalability and characteristics as an igneous rock. Basalt forms from lava flows, notably along ridges in the ocean. These ridges span globally, making basalt the Earth’s most abundant bedrock and providing an occasion for further exploration and testing. It has a relatively higher porosity level (10-15%, compared to peridotite around 1%), allowing for larger amounts of carbon dioxide to bind in pores on its surface, and with a higher density in carbonate form can more easily fall to the ocean floor for storage.

More than 8% of Earth’s surface includes basalt, and Sanna et al. noted the ocean basaltic storage potential can be as high as 8238 gigatons available (at 2700m deep and with 200m of sediments forming a cap layer for trapping). This ocean storage is attractive because sedimentary layers in the deep sea would provide an additional natural permeability layer to maintain the carbon underground and decrease potential escapage, essentially acting as a “lid” to trap the carbon beneath it. Trapping is important because it helps prevent gas escapage while mineralization occurs. With other forms of rock, increased temperatures (think: energy requirements), higher carbon dioxide purification levels, and elevated pressures could all have stricter requirements for permanence below the Earth’s surface. This is an important consideration as proper storage can reduce the risk for escapage back into the atmosphere or ocean. 

It has recently been identified that mineralization rates in basalt are also much faster than previously anticipated. The CarbFix project near the Hellisheidi power plant in Iceland conducted a test study in 2012 and injected more than 175 tons of pure carbon dioxide into a basalt aquifer. The original expectation was for the mineralization process to take several years, yet the study found that carbonate material was formed in just two years, impressing scientists for the fast turnaround time and storage potential. The sequestration prices are also generally cheaper than have been seen with other mineralizaton options. In areas like Wallula, WA and near Hellisheidi, sequestration is being achieved at about $10-30 per ton of carbon sequestered. Though the price of deep storage in ocean basalt is higher, early estimates suggest that it can be achieved at $200 per ton. By contrast, serpentine, with higher pressure, temperature, and purification requirements, can range from $200-600 per ton sequestered.

As the Earth is now approaching 420ppm carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, the need for long-term carbon sequestration is becoming more pressing. Other forms of rock continue to stand as competitive contenders for carbon removal due to their quick binding rates with carbon dioxide and potential to be brought to areas where carbon removal is conducted, rather than transporting captured carbon to at times distant injection sites. Processes like enhanced weathering can also both capture and store carbon, uniting both goals and requiring less resources. Yet, many of these above-ground methods can have direct environmental impacts in ecosystems due to their surface exposure, such as with olivine. In situ basalt storage has few external impacts due to deep injections, quick mineralization rates, and natural trapping mechanisms.

A second CarbFix project has started and should provide additional findings on carbonation rates in basalt in the coming years. Perhaps with further usage of the CarbFix technology, we have a widely scalable solution on our hands. Other externalities of basalt should also be considered, but while greater investigation is being conducted, basalt seems to be a promising contender. It could be expected that we will see more basalt in our futures. 

References

Goldberg, David S, and Angela L Slagle. “A Global Assessment of Deep-Sea Basalt Sites for Carbon Sequestration.” Energy Procedia, vol. 1, no. 1, Feb. 2009, pp. 3675–3682., doi:10.1016/j.egypro.2009.02.165.

Goldberg, David S, et al. “Carbon Dioxide Sequestration in Deep-Sea Basalt.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 105, no. 29, 22 July 2008, pp. 9920–9925.,  doi:10.1073/pnas.0804397105. 

Matter, Juerg M, et al. “Rapid Carbon Mineralization for Permanent Disposal of Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide Emissions.” Science, vol. 352, no. 6291, 10 June 2016, pp. 1312–1314., doi:10.1126/science.aad8132. 

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2019. Negative Emissions Technologies and Reliable Sequestration: A Research Agenda. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: https://doi.org/10.17226/25259.

Sanna, Aimaro, et al. “A Review of Mineral Carbonation Technologies to Sequester CO2.” Chem. Soc. Rev., 2014, pp. 8049–8080., doi:10.1039/c4cs00035h. 

Authored by David Morrow, Director of Research, Institute for Carbon Removal Law and Policy

Prepared for the Institute for Carbon Removal Law and Policy

It’s relatively clear what it would mean for a company like, say, FedEx to achieve net-zero carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions: it means that the company does not emit any more CO2 in a given year than it removes and sequesters in that year. There are some questions, of course, about exactly which emissions to count, but the basic idea is clear.

But what does it mean for banks, pension funds, and other financial institutions to achieve net-zero emissions, as a number of major banks have recently pledged to do? That’s the question that a group called the Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC) set out to answer through its Paris Aligned Investment Initiative (PAII).

Recently, PAII released it Net Zero Investment Framework, which PAII says “is designed to provide a basis on which a broad range of investors can make commitments to achieving net zero emissions and define strategies, measure alignment, and transition portfolios.” The Framework covers a lot of ground, as summarized in the table on page 8, but I want to focus on the role that carbon removal plays in the Framework.

In an appendix on “emissions accounting and offsets,” the Framework says:

As a general principle, investors should not use purchased offsets at the portfolio level to achieve emissions reduction targets. They should also adopt a precautionary approach when assessing assets’ alignment with net zero and the use of offsets. Recognising the finite availability of offsets from land use in particular, and the need to rapidly decarbonise all activities within sectors to the extent possible, investors should not allow the use of external offsets as a significant long-term strategy for achievement of decarbonisation goals by assets in their portfolios, except where there is no technologically or financially viable solution. The PAII will undertake further analysis in Phase II to assess the appropriate use of offsetting in specific sectors. Credits purchased by participants within regulated carbon markets that are designed to meet the net zero emissions goal can be used. 

Decarbonisation and avoided emissions should generally be treated separately. Similarly, investors should not offset emissions in one part of their portfolio through accounting for avoided emissions in another part. Given the necessity of effectively reaching zero emissions from investments over time, trading these two against each other is not consistent with creating incentives for investors and underlying assets to maximise their efforts to decarbonise their portfolios to the full extent possible.

There’s also a relevant line in the Framework’s “Paris Aligned Investment Initiative Net Zero Asset Owner Commitment” in Appendix C. Investors undertaking the commitment pledge to do a number of things, including:

Where offsets are necessary [because] there are no technologically and/or financially viable alternatives to eliminate emissions, investing in long-term carbon removals.

Overall, this seems like a sound approach that rightly prioritizes cutting emissions. Basically, it says that investors should avoid using offsets “except where there is no technologically or financially viable” way to cut emissions, and that they should not use avoided emissions as offsets. In other words, the Framework seems to be advising investors to view carbon removal as a last resort when decarbonization isn’t feasible, to prefer “long-term carbon removals” when offsetting is necessary, and to avoid investing in carbon removal themselves as a way to offset emissions from the companies they’ve invested in.

One thing to note is that the appendix text here doesn’t explicitly mention carbon removal, but it seems to use “offsets” to refer only to carbon removal, and not to avoided emissions. “Avoided emissions” are emissions that would have happened if someone hadn’t intervened by, for example, buying electric heat pumps for someone else to replace their gas-fired furnace. That sort of action isn’t carbon removal because it doesn’t physically remove carbon dioxide from the air; it only reduces the amount of carbon dioxide going into the air. The term “offsets” has sometimes been used to include both avoided emissions and actual carbon removal, so it would be helpful for the next iteration of the framework to clarify what they mean by “offset.”

With that distinction in mind, let’s break this down point by point:

1. 1. “Investors should not use purchased offsets at the portfolio level to achieve emissions reduction targets.” What does this mean? Suppose a pension fund invests in a retail company, and the retail company emits more CO2 than it removes. This principle is saying that, as a general rule, the pension fund should not buy offsets to counterbalance the emissions from the retail company. This is an interesting approach in that it puts the burden on the companies themselves, rather than the investors, to clean up their own emissions. If this were widely implemented, it would mean that companies looking for investors would have a strong incentive to achieve net-zero or even net-negative emissions.
   2. Investors “should also adopt a precautionary approach when assessing assets’ alignment with net zero and the use of offsets.” This is saying that investors should also be cautious when the companies they invest in say they are going to use offsets to reach net-zero emissions. Exactly what a “precautionary approach” looks like in this case isn’t spelled out, but at the very least, it means scrutinizing companies’ claims about offsets. Are their offsets actually removing as much carbon from the atmosphere as the companies claim? How permanently is the carbon sequestered?
   3. “Recognising the finite availability of offsets from land use in particular, and the need to rapidly decarbonise all activities within sectors to the extent possible, investors should not allow the use of external offsets as a significant long-term strategy for achievement of decarbonisation goals by assets in their portfolios, except where there is no technologically or financially viable solution.” In other words, don’t let companies rely on offsets as a big part of their long-term net-zero strategies, except when there is no “technologically or financially viable” alternative. The phrase “financially viable” leaves some wiggle room, but hopefully it will be spelled out in more detail through the “further analysis” the PAII is promising.  
   4. “Credits purchased by participants within regulated carbon markets that are designed to meet the net zero emissions goal can be used.” The charitable reading here is that investors should avoid wildcat offsetters who operate outside of well-regulated carbon markets, but “regulated carbon  markets” aren’t necessarily well regulated, so there’s work to be done here.
   5. “Decarbonisation and avoided emissions should generally be treated separately. Similarly, investors should not offset emissions in one part of their portfolio through accounting for avoided emissions in another part.” For example, if a bank is investing in a coal company and a wind energy company, it shouldn’t count the emissions avoided by the wind energy company as offsetting the emissions from the coal company. In other words, don’t do what financier Mark Carney tried to do recently.

As the Framework acknowledges, there’s a lot of work to be done to clarify the approach to offsetting and carbon removal, including how to determine whether cutting emissions is “financially viable,” what counts as a “regulated carbon market,” and how to determine whether a particular approach or project offers “long-term carbon removal.” The fundamental approach, though, rightly prioritizes cutting emissions and rightly emphasizes long-term carbon removal over avoided emissions in cases where offsetting is the only way to get to net-zero.

Authored by Simon Nicholson, Wil Burns, & David Morrow

Prepared for the Institute for Carbon Removal Law and Policy

United Airlines announced on December 10 plans for a multimillion-dollar investment in a Direct Air Capture (DAC) plant. The investment is part of United’s plans to become carbon-neutral by 2050.

In this blog post we look at what United is proposing and how to make sense of it.

Bottom line: This kind of investment in early-stage investigation into and development of DAC is immensely positive and should be encouraged, particularly in light of United being a prominent player in a hard-to-abate sector. At the same time, United’s pledge for support of DAC development cannot and should not be read in itself as a credible commitment to cleaning up the airline’s past or future carbon pollution. Instead, what United is doing here is helping to establish a technological pathway that may, in the future, yield real and significant carbon removal benefits. Whenever companies are talking about DAC or other forms of carbon removal, money spent on near-term research and development should be viewed as distinct from money spent over a number of years on the actual sequestering of carbon. We flesh these points out below and also point to some other interesting aspects of the United announcement.

What is United Planning?

United has pledged to invest in a DAC operation being developed in the United States by 1PointFive, a partnership between Oxy Low Carbon Ventures (a subsidiary of Occidental, an oil and gas company) and Rusheen Capital Management. 1PointFive’s website proclaims that the initiative’s mission is to become “the leading developer of DAC facilities worldwide.” This Oxy + Rusheen partnership is relying on a DAC technological system developed by Carbon Engineering in Canada. An earlier announcement from Carbon Engineering sets out plans via the 1PointFive venture for a plant that will be developed in West Texas to draw up to 500,000 (later updated to 1 million) tonnes of CO2 from the atmosphere each year and to sequester the CO2 in the Permian Basin.

United’s pledge comes via an already-signed letter of intent. United’s press release and reporting have not, though, yet revealed the exact amount of United’s investment, the precise purpose to which the investment is to be directed, and how United is viewing the investment alongside other efforts to tackle the airline’s carbon footprint. These will be important details to watch for in subsequent news about United’s DAC plans.

DAC could contribute to United’s efforts to reach carbon neutrality in a couple of ways. One way would be by United purchasing and utilizing synthetic jet fuel made from captured carbon. Such “carbon recycling” would lower the overall carbon footprint associated with a United flight. Another way, and this seems to be the intent of United’s deal with 1PointFive, would involve injecting captured carbon into long-term underground storage. Such geologic sequestration could conceivably be scaled to account for some large share of United’s CO2 pollution.

One final high-level point to note about United’s announcement is that United is distinguishing its interest in DAC from what the announcement terms “indirect measures like carbon-offsetting.” By carbon-offsetting, the announcement is referring to largely voluntary, consumer-driven efforts whereby customers on United flights pay a little extra money and in exchange United invests in tree planting or forest protection schemes. Forests and soils are hugely important carbon sinks and efforts to augment these and other nature-based solutions for carbon removal must be supported. Voluntary offsets programs are, though, problematic for a range of reasons, so this distinction being drawn by United between their DAC investment and offsets looks important. The main benefit will be if United makes the drawing down of carbon part of their core operations rather than as something that customers can add on a voluntary basis. 

Questions to Ask about the Investment

One article on the United announcement attributes to the company’s CEO Scott Kirby the claim that the 1PointFive project in which United is investing would capture enough carbon dioxide to offset nearly 10% of United’s annual emissions. A couple of things to note here:

1) Investing in early-stage research and development, or even in the building of working infrastructure, is not the same thing as paying for operations. It will be important to learn more about both what the United investment is intended for and what it is actually used for. Technological carbon removal, including DAC, is likely to be an important part of getting airlines to carbon neutrality. However, it will take sustained investment over decades to build up enough carbon removal capacity, and then successful operation of that capacity for some reasonable span of time for even a single airline like United to claim that DAC is offsetting emissions from business operations.

So, to be clear, an investment by United for infrastructure is all by itself a very positive thing. There is no need, then, to conflate that investment with emissions reductions or emissions offsetting claims.

2)  If United’s investment is going towards the operation of a successful DAC endeavor, there are some questions that should be asked and answered:

1. 1. How much of the potential 1 million tonnes of CO2 per year from the planned 1PointFive facility could United rightfully claim? Might others also be looking to claim credit for actually capturing and sequestering CO2 once the plant is operational? How do we avoid double, or more, counting of the “same” emissions reductions to ensure the integrity of the emerging carbon dioxide removal markets? 
   2. Even if United claims all of the CO2 stored annually by a working facility at the 1 million tonne scale, this alone would be far shy of 10% of United’s annual Scope 1 emissions, which United reported to be around 34 million tonnes in its disclosure to CDP.
   3. Storing CO2 directly in geological formations will have different climate effects than using captured CO2 for enhanced oil recovery or for the creation of short-lived products like a synthetic fuel. As a recent working paper from David Morrow and Michael Thompson notes, the relevant questions to be asked here are, where does the carbon come from and where does the carbon go?
   4. From where will the energy come to power the new DAC facility? Just as directing captured CO2 towards enhanced oil recovery can obviate climate benefits, so powering DAC with fossil fuels rather than renewable energy makes for problematic climate math.

All of this is to say that the accounting around carbon removal claims by way of DAC is not a straightforward thing. It will be useful and important to watch how United’s investment relationship with 1PointFive develops. Transparency to enable robust evaluation will be essential.

One model for corporate transparency around DAC plans comes from tech company Stripe. Stripe has set out: a) a corporate intent to be an early investor in development of promising carbon removal approaches; b) a plan to help to build out a market for carbon removal by being a steady customer for actual carbon removal services over a period of years; and c) a clear method by which carbon removal options are being evaluated and selected. Details of the Stripe approach are here, and may provide guidance for other early movers like United.

—

Here’s a metaphor. Imagine a kid spilling Cheerios on the floor and then committing to cleaning them up. If the kid offers to invest in purchasing a vacuum cleaner, that’s a good first step. The kid should not get credit for cleaning up the mess, though, until the vacuum cleaner is running and is sucking up the cereal. (And if the kid’s sibling ends up being the one doing the actual vacuuming, it’s important to make sure that both kids aren’t claiming full credit for cleaning up the mess.) It’s also important to understand what the kid’s plan is if the vacuum cleaner doesn’t arrive or if it fails to operate as advertised. And, most importantly, what’s the kid’s plan for limiting the flow of Cheerios to the floor? The vacuuming component only works when aligned with a strong and robust reduce-the-dropping-of-the-Cheerios plan.

The United statement is to be applauded and, at the same time, United’s actions on the back of the statement should receive careful scrutiny.

Simon Nicholson and Wil Burns are Co-directors and David Morrow is Director of Research at the Institute for Carbon Removal Law and Policy in the School of International Service at American University.

Authored by David Morrow, Director of Research, Institute for Carbon Removal Law and Policy

Prepared for the Institute for Carbon Removal Law and Policy

Ask ten people what role “carbon capture” should play in addressing climate change, and you will likely get a dozen different answers, in part because the term “carbon capture” gets used in so many ways. It sometimes refers only to technologies that capture carbon dioxide from large point-sources, such as power plants or steel factories; sometimes only to technologies that scrub carbon dioxide from the ambient air; and sometimes to both. This terminological confusion not only makes it harder to understand one another in important climate policy conversations, but it leads people to run together different technologies that could play very different roles in climate policy.

In a new working paper, Michael Thompson (Carnegie Climate Governance Initiative) and I try to cut through one of the thorniest knots in this confusing conversation: what is the relationship between carbon removal and carbon capture with utilization and storage (CCUS)?

The paper encourages people to stop worrying so much about technological categories and focus instead on two simple questions:

(1) Where does the captured carbon come from?

(2) Where does the captured carbon go?

We argue that answering these two questions makes it easy to see which pathways lead to carbon removal, which to carbon recycling, and which to emissions reductions. The final figure in the paper, shown here, summarizes the results of this analysis.

For more details, download the working paper, “Reduce, Remove, Recycle: Clarifying the Overlap between Carbon Removal and CCUS.”