Rupture, Trough, and Recovery of CDR

How CDR 2.0 may differ from the industry’s first several years

by Jason Grillo


Image source: iStock, Brian Jackson

The impediment to action advances action. What stands in the way becomes the way” -Marcus Aurelius

Well it’s been quite a 12-month news cycle these last few weeks! I don’t want to discuss national or international politics much here, but suffice to say that when Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in Davos remarks that  the international system is in a state of “rupture”, people take note. 

In that backdrop of turmoil, I’d like to discuss what the perhaps bumpy future of carbon removal might look like in the longer time horizon. I’m basing this off the behavior of other industries, past climate peaks and troughs, and my own experiences in the field since I started working in CDR in late 2019.

The Trough

I’ll repeat my assertion in my previous post that per the Gartner ‘hype cycle’ chart, CDR generally is past the ‘peak’, and is just about to begin sliding into the Trough of Disillusionment. 

Source: Wikipedia

Uncertainty in markets and policy will likely make the next few years a challenging time for carbon removal project developers, who could struggle to achieve funding and product sales. The “less than 5 percent of the potential audience has adopted fully” above, supports the market situation today: the universe of potential buyers has not panned out as expected, with Microsoft still dominant as the world’s biggest CDR buyer – hence this meme here created by the “Carbon Removal Memes” folks.

While the model above suggests venture may offer second or third rounds of funding to some lucky companies, best money may come from other sources of financing: project financing, debt financing, or product revenue. Venture funding in hardware is a tough slog, and may be the same for carbon removal project developers. There is a danger that when venture money is put into hardware projects that ultimately fail, venture may leave the sector altogether – hence the lapse of climate venture funding between Solyndra’s collapse in 2011 and 2019/2020.  This would mimic behavior in Cleantech 1.0, where venture funded A123, A Better Place, and (infamously) Solyndra all collapsed (1,2). 

In the ‘Trough’ startups may close, early stage funders may not follow on, personnel may leave the CDR industry or depart climate altogether and pursue other interests in different industries. 

Open questions: How long will this period last? How deep will it go? And what types of activities will spur a rally?

The Seeds of Recovery

Other industries offer a parallel course to what CDR could see in the 5 to 10 year time horizon. The first internet wave crashed in 2000-2001; Google was founded in 1998 but didn’t IPO until 2003; Facebook was founded in 2003, Apple had its own wild trajectory with, then without, then with, Steve Jobs at the helm.  Cleantech 1.0 had its bubble burst around 2011, only to have solar and wind and battery startup survivors grow and develop and outpace expectations. And then we witnessed a  wave of a few years of early stage investment starting in the early 2020s, renamed as “Climate Tech.”

I predict a similar model will happen in CDR with crisis, rework, and steady robust recovery as a pathway to the future. Several factors are to play into this:

First, CDR 1.0 survivors will carry the industry. Some companies founded before say 2025 will ride out the storm, either by securing the capital they need, achieving commercial success in a challenging market environment, or pivoting to a new business model altogether. Climeworks is pivoting with Climeworks Solutions, offering portfolios of both engineered and nature-based approaches that remove CO₂ from the atmosphere. And Heirloom is partnering with United Airlines to produce Sustainable Aviation Fuel. Biochar deployment in a funding landscape absent venture money can yield physical product for sale with economic value, in addition to delivering CDR credits. That method alone could represent the growth driver for durable CDR credit markets in the next coming years while other CDR methods begin their first commercial deployments.

Here again, Cleantech 1.0 provides a useful analog when wind and solar commercial deployments advanced during the 2011-2019 period between Cleantech 1.0 and Climate Tech 2.0 (roughly). Government support was part of that with German Feed-in tariffs, but the main product – energy – as well as voluntary market Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) provided funding to keep these industries growing. Large, if not industry leading, success stories are also able to weather this type of market adjustment: IBM moved to services rather than primarily manufacturing computers. Yahoo is still alive and kicking. As are Cleantech 1.0 companies First Solar and this Tesla outfit you may have heard a bit about. 

Second, standard consolidation. As of 2026, many, many organizations offer standards for “What Is Quality CDR.” In a new industry, it is natural that that will happen since nobody really has a sense of what “Quality” truly means. The problem is that none are truly comprehensive, and this set of fragmented standards hurts advancement of the field, since outsiders looking in are forced to choose between a multitude of unfamiliar rubrics for comparing projects. This XKCD comic that made the rounds in AirMiners a few years ago best captures this phenomenon. My personal take is that there’s probably room for only a handful of standards relative to the multitude we see today, and that achieving clarity on these will make for a better directed recovery of CDR.

The nature of the standards will depend on what voluntary carbon removal credit buyers want to see. Regardless of whether early catalytic buyers, project developers, and their venture backers believe 1,000 years durability is true “quality,” the mainstream buyers will bear out the case in the market. If say 200 years+ is what becomes the de facto standard, so be it.

That said, the EU’s CRCF voluntary standard for biochar, BECCS, and DAC could be a starting point for this consolidation.

Third, market infrastructure. For one thing, many marketplaces exist for carbon removal credits, each with their own vetting system for who gets in. Buyers have a multitude of channels to choose from, but there are no consolidated exchanges yet.

Contract agreements for purchases are also bespoke; making them more turnkey is the crux of the effort at OSCAR – standardizing contract language to ease friction in carbon removal transactions (3). 

Fourth, price discovery is a key hurdle as well. We are starting to see glimpses of it with broad price bands reported likely due to low numbers of reportable prices in transactions, but nobody can say “ERW is trading at this price”, or (per above) what the 200-year vs 1000 durability price differential may be in a geography of interest. Such clarity may come with greater transaction volume (read: liquidity), but buyers need better price visibility to buy! 

A secondary market of trading credits will advance price visibility as well. Right now there is not much of a market trading issued but not retired credits. Deliveries are, by and large, assumed to be retirements rather than tradable.

Fifth, financial innovation can yield a viable path to recovery as well. Consider the potential for CDR to be considered as an asset that can be collateralized, rather than an expense. The work of the Carbon Liabilities and Assets Initiative is particularly interesting in that regard. It  removes offsets of any variety from the P&L (which may affect executive compensation and stock price) and instead characterizes credits as an asset to be countered against a liability.

The Rebound: VCM 2.0 and Compliance Markets

Crucially, policy measures to support CDR – at times taking years of painstaking work – will enable the development of both voluntary and compliance markets.

Sylvera, “Compliance Markets to Overtake Voluntary Demand” State of Carbon Credits 2025, Jan 2026.

Sylvera estimates that sometime in the next several years, compliance market volume of CO2e will surpass that of voluntary carbon markets. As CDR becomes better integrated into compliance markets, financing for projects may step in to support on the grounds of a more solid customer base (4). I agree with Robert Hoglund’s assertion first that “Carbon removal needs a new story”, and concur with his point that “[f]or compliance, the only real driver for durable carbon removal in the medium term is inclusion into the UK and EU ETS.” We also need to note his caveat that the high price of durable CDR would be too much to be viable in  those markets absent Contract for Difference (CfD) government support.

A common theory of change is that anticipating compliance markets will spur voluntary climate action. That way the buyers will grow beyond the courageous few maverick companies who have deep margins to spare. As compliance markets grow and incorporate carbon removal into their schemes, a new round of startups may spring up, spurring technological innovations that rival the monumental work that so many many startup founders to date have put into novel methods to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.

Carbon removal can also achieve re-emergence through insetting and industrial value chain integration. The entrepreneur of CDR 1.0 may become the intrapreneur of CDR 2.0, working inside a company so that the industrial processes that remove carbon become part of the organization’s value chain. While entrepreneurial in its nature, ‘intrapreneurship’ offers its own challenges, risks, and advantages over a stand-alone startup – more to come on this. As a built-in part of an existing company, CDR can offer some way to solve a general business problem, raise revenue, reduce costs, or acquire customers for a larger business. So carbon removal projects can become a  ‘race to the top’ that yield economic benefits rather than being perceived as an add-on cost of doing business. 

The key risk in the CDR 2.0 world would be policy uncertainty – hence starting this piece off with the term “Rupture.” In a world where international cooperation is weakening, arriving at global standards – or at least a handful of accepted standards – will prove a challenge. The U.N., World Bank, WTO, climate COP and other international bodies could see their power and influence deteriorate, which would diminish the potential for international carbon markets as well. Carbon nationalism may rise as well, where governments assert greater control of the carbon emissions mitigation and sequestration activities within their borders.

Conclusions

Just as the tides wash in and out, the tide of fortune and misfortune cycles through. Such is the way with so many aspects of life; the fledgling durable carbon removal industry will seem no different from others in that regard. While there are significant obstacles in the path of durable carbon removal today, the failures of the market point to pathways for renewal after a time of turbulence. Pragmatism in the near term will lead to flourishing in the longer term.

Finally, my view is that Prime Minister Carney may very well be right about the state of rupture – he got a rare standing ovation from the Davos audience. As a carbon removal community, we would be blind not to listen to the broader context of global uncertainty that coincides with an uncertain time for our industry, and seek opportunities for recovery.  I believe a better world will ultimately emerge, whose achievements, both in climate and beyond, dwarf those of the old. It’s a future worth fighting for.

Endnotes:

  1. Yes, Solyndra received a $535M loan from the DOE in 2009, and additionally had about $1 billion in venture money invested in it as well – see article here from 2011.
  2. Fun fact: When I was working at a solar inverter company, I actually toured the Solynda factory in Fremont, California…just weeks before the company declared bankruptcy.
  3. Utterly shameless plug directing you to a recent webinar discussing OSCAR, hosted by the illustrious Institute for Responsible Carbon Removal, American University.
  4. Biopharma companies are able to IPO without product revenue simply for that reason: customers and health insurers will pay for potentially life-saving and disease-altering therapeutic interventions. See previous Substack on this situation here.

Jason Grillo is the Principal of Earthlight Enterprises marketing and carbon finance consultancy, Co-Founded AirMiners, and is a voluntary contributor to CDR.FYI. The opinions expressed in this writing are the author’s own and do not reflect the position of any employer, client, or associated organization. This post also appears on his Climagination Substack. 

Observations from CDR in 2025

A mixed bag for CDR, depending on method


In the end of year opining about the state of CDR, there doesn’t seem to be much consensus about the trajectory of the industry: Is carbon removal coming? Going? Staying put? Tough to say. Some headlines suggest that 2025 was a bad year for CDR, while others see a brighter year in the 12 months that just concluded. 

In this post I’ll break down some of the positives, some of the negatives, and offer some suggestions about what this reveals about CDR – and offer some utter speculation about 2026 and beyond as well.

So, what the heck just happened? 

A Transitional Year for CDR

From this writer’s perspective, the CDR industry is undergoing the natural maturation that follows the initial ‘hype cycle’ as it dissipates. Per Nat Bullard’s January 2025 “State of Decarbonization” slide deck, there are over 500 carbon removal startups in existence. Quiet part out loud: Not all of them are going to make it.

Image source: https://www.nathanielbullard.com/presentations

One reason for that is that climate investing – including CDR – pulled back during 2025. However, this trend was already in place for at least a year or two prior.¹ The “Cambrian Explosion” of CDR companies for several years starting in, say, 2019 could not last: sooner or later, good ideas and standards will emerge, and less appealing solutions will suffer in the market (or at least get mothballed). Per Erik Amundson here, that might not be the worst thing: the most adaptable organizations will find a way to survive and progress. 

Per the Gartner ‘hype cycle’ chart, my sense is that CDR generally is past the ‘peak’, and is just about to begin the ‘sliding into the trough’

Source: Wikipedia

Much of the distress surrounding the state of carbon removal focuses on the fact that startups are beginning to go out of business, having not delivered carbon removal tonnage. By 2025, some investors from the 2020 to 2022 period started to expect a return, while Series A or Series B funding became significantly tougher. Not that financing events did not happen – they did – they were only tougher to come by, especially in the $1M to $5M range as noted in this Planet2050 + CDR.fyi market report

In short, the CDR field in 2025 started to experience a ‘winnowing’; I’m going to suggest in the next section that companies that progress or are culled out might be organized by method of CDR.

Differentiation

How macro trends affect the broad industry are increasingly differentiated by the major methods that have emerged over the 5-year period from 2020-2025. I’m not saying that new, innovative solutions won’t ever step up, but as of this writing, the field seems to be sorting out among a few distinct CDR method classes.

Rather than external factors affecting all companies and all methods equally, 2025 saw increased differentiation in the fortunes of CDR project developers organized by the type of solution on offer. Policy shifts, notably in the United States, financial demands, and customer expectations did not affect all companies equally throughout 2025. I’ll recount some of the effects on sub-sectors of CDR below.

For Direct Air Capture companies, 2025 was ‘tough sledding’. The retraction of IRA funding for the DAC Hubs in the United States is causing many of the leading companies to scramble for alternate sources of financing. Or to move to other countries, such as Canada.

Biochar saw robust growth with the sector starting to achieve traction for the physical biochar produced. Registries such as Isometric and Climate Action Reserve have picked up on this trend, offering new methodologies for biochar as demand for registry services grows. 

In Enhanced Weathering, the excellent news was that an ERW company – Mati Carbon – won the grand prize for the XPRIZE carbon removal competition, plus the first ever verified ERW carbon removal credits were issued. That said, the necessity of improving MRV in a complex, open system and pressures on the economics of ERW are challenges to consider for the future.

In Marine CDR, Gigablue grabbed headlines in January with its 4-year, 200,000 ton CDR deal, though the field in general still requires a good amount of scientific research and upfront development money before making good on its vast potential, similar to how the biopharmaceuticals industry operates. The key concern is the extent to which the 2024 shutdown of Running Tide more broadly affected the marine CDR investment landscape.

Market Development

Surprise: Microsoft remains the predominant purchaser ofCDR credits!²  Per Allied Offsets Voluntary Carbon Market 2025 Review below, the number of active buyers did increase – slightly – in 2025 relative to 2024. That said, why aren’t other companies stepping up?

Source: Allied Offsets Voluntary Carbon Market 2025 Review

The good news is that there was increasing interest in CDR – and climate generally – outside of the United States, especially in Asia. For example Japan has begun to be the site of more CDR activity, with Japanese corporate investors increasingly attending overseas events. My sense is that purchases of carbon removal credits by Japanese companies will advance apace as the country rolls out its GX League, as government activities can drive voluntary action. Singapore has also become a major CDR hub, as both the national government and financial sector in the country are keenly pursuing carbon removal solutions.

Second, 2025 laid bare the need for infrastructure and market tools to advance the industry. The heightened public profile of CDR at the COP conference also strengthens the case for buyers and other industry supporters. OSCAR, an initiative to launch a standard carbon removal contract applicable across all methodologies globally is an example of a catalyst that can cut through transactional friction. (disclosure: I’m a Co-Founder). As companies offering supply to the market mature, the business infrastructure supporting commercial and financial transactions will have to develop in parallel. Look to 2026 for more of such efforts.

Third, end-use applications for carbon removal projects are becoming more important. Notably, Verde Resources (a biochar-to-asphalt utilization company) announced in late December that it is registering for an underwritten public offering on NASDAQ. My stance is that CDR companies who can develop revenue-generating or cost-saving outcomes for their customers are likely to win out in the long run, providing value beyond selling a carbon credit itself.

Insetting is a key pathway to investigate; the economic value chain beyond  carbon removal credits may spur adoption of CDR solutions. In that light, the practice of intrapreneurship to create value within businesses can be decisive, rather than presenting carbon removal credits as a pure expense that hits a P&L statement (and potentially affects executive compensation).

Conclusions

2025 proved to be a mixed bag for carbon removal as an industry. The accelerated dropoff in funding poses a hurdle to scale-up. The most successful project developers gained commercial traction for physical products and carbon removal credits in this difficult financing and policy environment. My take is that the general economic and policy environment will affect companies differently, dependent on what sector they are, and the prospects for revenue generation in other value chains. Some will see ceilings of success along faster or slower timelines; some will accelerate, while others plateau. The industry still has a long way to go – it’s still in its ‘tween’ or early teenage years – but has definitely established itself as a key solution in the climate landscape. 

 

¹ Susan Su’s comments in the linked video were recorded in late 2024.

² Per CDR.fyi Purchaser leaderboard as of January 2, 2025.

 

Jason Grillo is the Principal of Earthlight Enterprises marketing and carbon finance consultancy, Co-Founded AirMiners, and is a voluntary contributor to CDR.FYI. The opinions expressed in this writing are the author’s own and do not reflect the position of any employer, client, or associated organization. This post also appears on the blog site of the Institute for Responsible Carbon Removal, American University.

If a tree grows in the forest and no one is there to measure it, does it capture any carbon? – Keeling’s Descent with Ryan Davidson

KD #2: A few thoughts on MRV and additionality


It’s an age-old question, and it’s perhaps more philosophical than anything: If a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?

I’ve always argued that it does not. By definition, sound waves need eardrums to hit for them to constitute sounds, as opposed to merely vibrations moving through the air. (Of course, I’m assuming no squirrels, rabbits, chipmunks, or other forest-dwelling, eardrum-possessing creatures are present, either.)

But a newer question, more relevant to our physical world, might be: If a tree grows in the forest and no one is around to measure it, does it capture any carbon?

The answer might not be as straightforward as you think.

Image courtesy of Tiia Monto under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license.

Let’s set the stage

Additionality and MRV (monitoring, reporting, and verification) are distinct concepts, but in many ways, they walk hand-in-hand.

According to the World Resources Institute (WRI), a “CDR activity is additional when it can prove that it would not have otherwise happened” without the influence of an organized project and the credit revenues that funded it.

Also according to WRI, MRV is “a process for tracking the outcomes of climate mitigation activities. It includes measurement, reporting, and verification to quantify and transparently share information on the outcomes of a variety of climate actions, as well as ongoing monitoring to ensure that outcomes are maintained over time.” Required to verify the delta between a system’s emissions (or negative emissions) with and without the desired intervention, performing robust MRV is the only way for a developer (or country, or whoever wishes to understand their emissions) to have high confidence – and any evidence – that their intervention has removed as much CO2 from the atmosphere as they said it would.

Without this robust MRV, developers don’t know how much CO2 they’ve removed. Without knowing how much CO2 they’ve removed, they can’t issue carbon credits. Without carbon credits, corporate buyers can’t apply removals to their respective carbon budgets while developers lose the backbones of their capital stacks. Without capital, projects fall apart.

MRV and additionality today are so central to the carbon removal ecosystem that sometimes it feels like we talk about the carbon removal credits more than the carbon removal itself.

Despite what The Guardian says (or, conversely, what it… also says?), carbon credits aren’t going anywhere. I want to be clear on that. However, I do think it’s worth asking: Do we over-index on credits?

How did we actually get here?

Credits and offsets for carbon dioxide, or pollutants in general, are not new. Their history goes back decades:

    • The U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 introduced sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxide offset requirements for new and modified industrial facilities.
    • The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ran a lead credit trading program from 1982 to 1988 before completing the phaseout of leaded gasoline in 1996.
    • The Montreal Protocol set a precedent for international emissions cap-and-trade systems in 1987, specifically for chlorofluorocarbons and other ozone-depleting substances.
    • Title IV of the U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 set a cap on sulfur dioxide emissions and the EPA issued a finite number of tradable allowances.
    • Using the Montreal Protocol as a model, the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 set mandatory emissions limitation and reduction commitments for 37 industrialized countries and the E.U. and allowed for carbon credit trading through flexible mechanisms.
    • To implement the Kyoto Protocol, the E.U. created an emissions trading system (ETS) in 2003; while prices remained as low as €5 in 2017, prices have since spiked, even briefly surpassing €100 in 2023.
    • The Paris Agreement of 2015, and specifically Article 6, opened the door for countries to support carbon reduction and removal projects in other countries and apply those reductions and removals toward their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).
President George H.W. Bush signs the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 into law. Remember when Democrats and Republicans worked together on addressing environmental issues? Yeah, me neither. Image courtesy of PBS News

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

It can feel like they haven’t, but the agreements from Montreal, Kyoto, and Paris have definitely spurred environmental progress (as skeptical as many of us tend to be about international environmental agreements).

However, that the storied history of carbon credits may as well be the storied history of carbon credit scandals is news to nobody reading this blog. The fact that there is now an accepted premium on carbon removal credits, as opposed to more conventional offsets for “avoided deforestation,” lends credibility to the still early-stage global carbon removal ecosystem. And even to those not familiar with CDR, this premium shouldn’t come as a shock; while human activity has raised atmospheric CO2 levels by over 50 percent, other gases in the atmosphere still outnumber CO2 by roughly 2,300-to-1. We really are looking for needles in haystacks.

Is the voluntary carbon market the right way to look through those haystacks?

For as much talk as there is about the voluntary carbon market (VCM) and its role in scaling carbon removal, as a whole we are missing a few key points. Marc Roston, senior research scholar at Stanford’s Precourt Institute for Energy, recently went on The Carbon Curve to discuss his paper from April, titled “The Market That Won’t Trade: Fixing Structural Failures in the Spot Market for Carbon Removals.” He offers three core reasons why the VCM fails to function like a typical market:

    1. Alienability, or Original Sin: The VCM inherited from compliance markets the idea that buyers could purchase certificates and retire them. Under a compliance scheme in which certificates are just permission slips to emit, there’s no point in keeping those certificates; they can go back to the regulator. But under a voluntary CDR scheme, credits are supposed to represent ongoing ownership. Retiring those credits absolves the buyer (and more importantly, the developer) from maintaining the project.
    2. Custody, or the “Hotel California” problem: In commodities markets (or any other market), transferability is key. Much of the value of an asset comes from the ability to move it or sell it to someone else. With CDR, you can store the CO2, but it can never leave its “storage facility.” So, when buying carbon removal, buyers run the risk of not understanding what they own or where their assets are, and they certainly can’t move their assets.
    3. Fungibility: Other commodities are fungible, but CO2 captured via some engineered method does not have the same storage timeline or reversal risk as CO2 captured via some nature-based method. And because ton-year accounting is a “philosophical exercise” more than anything, Marc offers us this: “If you emit a ton of CO2 in the atmosphere, you have an obligation to remove a ton of CO2. That has nothing to do with discounting, nothing to do with the social cost of carbon. It has everything to do with the confidence with which you defease the liability.”

I agree that we need to fix these three failures of the VCM as it exists today if it is ever going to mature and function as a legitimate market. But I think it’s worth considering whether it’s possible to achieve some level of negative emissions without going through these growing pains.

MRV isn’t exactly free

Within power generation, overall costs tend to balloon when maintenance costs increase. This can happen with newer technologies, like floating offshore wind turbines, and this can happen with older technologies, like aging nuclear plants. In the former case, massive vessels must tow turbines the size of the Eiffel Tower back to port for lengthy maintenance procedures. In the latter case, evolving regulations can force expensive upgrades. Either way, customers bear the costs.

Carbon removal is no different.

Ongoing operational costs can (and often do) unexpectedly increase, and MRV is a major line item among those costs. For some of the open-system methods, like enhanced rock weathering and ocean alkalinity enhancement, we may someday have a scalable solution to measure CO2-capture at a relatively low cost. Or perhaps we’ll accept some sort of uncertainty range and simply sell the number of credits corresponding with the lower bound of that range to prevent over-crediting. Given that MRV can account for more than half of ERW and OAE project costs, one of these things will simply have to happen if we want to scale these solutions.

Graph courtesy of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and the London School of Economics and Political Science.

I’m a fan of open-system CDR methods not because of their carbon removal attributes, but because of their potentially monetizable side benefits. Let’s say, for example, that we can eliminate enough OPEX and overhead costs in an ERW project for the agricultural benefits to make the project economically viable in its own right. All of a sudden, carbon credits are unnecessary, and the project is by definition not additional. Under our conventional thinking around CDR, this would not be a good thing, because it would no longer be true carbon removal at all. It would simply be the status quo.

But who cares that nobody can take credit for the project? Negative emissions are negative emissions, and that’s really all we should be going for. Just as developers of new technologies should celebrate when their innovations become boring, we should celebrate when carbon removal becomes non-additional… and is therefore not “carbon removal” at all.

A basic thought experiment

This might be an unpopular question, but I’ll ask it anyway. When entities that verify removals, certify credits, or facilitate transactions make up such a large portion of the carbon removal ecosystem, are we even aiming for the right goal? Or better yet: Are we even playing the right game?

An economy-wide crash, or at the very least a dip, is at this point more a question of “when” than “if.” The AI bubble buoying the tech companies (who buy virtually 100 percent of carbon removal credits) will eventually pop, profits will fall, and expenses will have to fall with them. I’d like to say this is just the devil on my shoulder speaking, but it’s not. And when this crash (or dip) happens, will CDR buyers continue to buy? Will they still pay a premium for the permanence and the MRV? I’m no clairvoyant, but I’m pretty confident in my guess.

As crazy as it may seem, the carbon removal ecosystem may do itself a favor by radically rethinking additionality and the associated MRV. This piece is, of course, not comprehensive. It doesn’t detail things like certification, permanence, durability, or leakage, and it doesn’t propose a solution for how we could actually reduce CAPEX to the point at which “side benefits” provide reason enough to invest in a project with negative emissions. I merely hope to propose a basic thought experiment.

So, once more: If a tree grows in the forest and no one is there to measure it, does it capture any carbon?

I’d say it does.

But we’d better coordinate an international protocol to make sure.

Latest CO2 reading: 425.82 ppm

Ryan Davidson is a business development and policy specialist in the U.S. marine energy sector, and in his free time he writes Renaissance Carbon, a weekly Substack about the tech, politics, and culture of all things carbon. The opinions expressed in Keeling’s Descent are his own and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of any employer.

Contact: ryandavidson911@gmail.com

Pallets to Pyrolysis: A Transformational Journey – Climagination with Jason Grillo

Caption: Above image generated from Google Gemini AI

How an industry that “makes ship happen” is poised to become a carbon removal pioneer


“In innovations that are based on process need, everybody in the organization always knows that the need exists. Yet usually nobody does anything about it. However when the innovation appears, it is immediately accepted as ‘obvious’ and soon becomes ‘standard’ “

-Peter Drucker, Innovation and Entrepreneurship

Sometimes the solutions that we seek are just under our very noses, in seemingly innocuous places that only come into focus when you step back for a second. A case in point is exactly that for two industries: carbon removal and wooden pallets. 

In this post I’ll take up the case of why the wooden pallet industry may be such a ‘beachhead’ for scaling biochar by mainstreaming it into important sectors, adding an innovative solution to address a key process need.

Innovation in Action

On October 21 and 22, process innovation was on display for all to see at the National Wood Pallet and Container Association (NWPCA) fall plant tours in Houston, Texas. Truly it was a privilege to attend, with the highlight being a tour of industrial transformation through biochar at a pilot pyrolysis facility on the site of pallet remanufacturer, 48forty Solutions.

Meet ‘Audrey’,  the RAINMAKER™  pyrolyzer who came into the world just outside of Austin, Texas, as an induction-based pyrolysis machine from the environmental technology company, LOCOAL. She’s always looking for someone to feed her 8-10mm wood chip feedstock, and her favorite musical is Little Shop of Horrors. 

LOCOAL CEO Miles Murray presenting ‘Audrey’ the RAINMAKER™ pyrolyzer to NWPCA tour attendees

To fill in the picture further, Audrey is just getting her final checks done onsite. She can consume two tons of feedstock per hour and produce biochar, electricity from natural gas, and bio-oil, as well as wood vinegar. 

So this innovation is real, and happening now on the ground level. But let’s zoom out a minute to talk about why and how this moment is right for wooden pallet pyrolysis to create biochar.

Why Pallets? Why now?

For background, the pallet industry literally supports shipments of goods that we all depend on for daily living. Most goods that travel for mass delivery happen on the top of a wooden pallet – in the United States 1.8 billion pallet units are in circulation, 92% of which are wood, and 500 million are manufactured each year. The estimated value of the wooden pallet industry is $20 billion in 2025. Over 2500 firms are listed by the US Census as “Wooden Container and Pallet Manufacturers”¹; with a prevalence of small and mid-sized businesses. While there are several large firms, the data suggest that the industry is not highly concentrated relative to other industries.²

Sustainability is on the forefront of wooden pallet companies’ minds: though 95% of wooden pallets are recyclable, the industry generates 500,000 tons of landfill wood waste in the form of unusable, unrecyclable pallets.³ While a 2020 study concluded that wooden pallets have a (marginally) better carbon footprint relative to plastic pallets, the wooden pallet industry sees a need to innovate for sustainability. To that end the NWPCA achieved UL certification for a wooden pallet Environmental Product Declaration (EPD) in July 2020.

In that light, how to dispose of unusable wooden pallets is a key consideration. Some companies sell ground-up wood waste wood as mulch or use in fiberboard and boiler fuel. However, the economics of the market for these end uses may not be favorable depending on the recycling site dynamics – with over 2500 companies in various geographies, there is significant variability as to how viable those end-use markets are to any individual company. Sending large quantities of wood waste outright to a landfill requires paying a tipping fee as well, making that a less attractive option from a financial and climate perspective. 

With these trends in mind, additional revenue streams or opportunities to derive value from supply chain waste can confer a competitive advantage to pallet companies.

Enter biochar.

Why Biochar? Why now?

Biochar is having a moment as a high-growth field, and efforts are afoot to accelerate biochar carbon removal through industrial integration, with many sessions dedicated to that prospect at the US Biochar Initiative 2025 North American Biochar Conference.

The biochar production industry is growing rapidly worldwide, with deliveries of biochar carbon credits doubling each year from 2022 to 2024. As a consequence, biochar has become by far the most commonly delivering carbon removal method according to CDR.FYI.4

Biochar pyrolysis equipment manufacturers are benefiting from credit delivery growth, and are expanding their offerings to service more industrial biochar producing clients. With this future in mind, the market value of industrial scale equipment manufacturers is forecasted to grow at an over 11% combined annual growth rate from 2024 to 2028.

Integrating into existing industries by finding innovative use cases has been a key question for the biochar industry for many years (see this 2021 AirMiners event on exactly that topic). The difference now is that instead of biochar entrepreneurs looking at innovative use-cases for its end products, the industry could advance by creating innovative pathways to embed the practice of biochar production into existing verticals for developing projects.

Achieving an adequate return on investment for intrapreneurs and their companies is the key step.

The Business Case 

In short, biochar has the opportunity to turn a waste from a cost to a more substantial revenue generator. 

Pyrolysis that creates biochar from wood waste can rely on multiple revenue streams:

    • Energy generation revenue from the pyrolysis process, especially with Federal 48E tax credits for bioenergy in the US under certain conditions5
    • Sales of physical biochar for customers to use or build into their own products.
    • Tipping fees if the pyrolysis site is permitted to receive municipal solid waste (MSW) or construction and demolition wood waste (C&D)
    • Carbon revenue, from either
      • Offsetting where the carbon credit – and environmental benefit value – is sold to an entity separate from the physical char purchaser.
      • Insetting where the carbon benefit and the char are bundled together and sold to a single company to address their supply chain Scope 3 emissions 

As an added bonus, pallet producers as established businesses could have access to debt financing for project development that eludes many smaller biochar startups. 

In that light, biochar players can see a ready-made partner with wooden pallet companies for growth. Across the wooden pallet industry, pallet producers can ‘hire’ biochar for the job-to-be-done: sustainable wood waste management.

What is the Next Milestone?

Significant opportunity exists here at the intersection of these two industries, and innovation in business models is a key driver.  

On the one hand, larger pallet recyclers could purchase pyrolysis units themselves, and deploy at different sites where doing so is economically viable and technically feasible. Alternatively, groups of smaller local pallet companies may form joint ventures or special purpose vehicles (SPVs) which could pool financial resources and establish a mutual pyrolysis site to collect feedstock across several sites. They could also potentially coordinate with regional biochar networks to share best practices.

The most critical aspect of innovating within the industry at this point is to establish a core group of leaders dedicated to advancing the practice of pyrolysis. The ‘Early Adopters’ can provide examples and teaching for the industry, so that others can learn of the successes, challenges, and opportunities experienced at the early stages.

Fortunately we know many of those folks already:

L to R Kat Vasquez (Oxnard Pallet Co), Carrie Collins (Collins Pallet Recycling), Heather Ross (Atlas Pallet), Jess Bonsall (48forty Solutions), Jason Grillo (Earthlight Enterprises), Nick Rovai (Collins Pallet Recycling).
Missing: Max Ross (Atlas Pallet) Tom Miles (former Executive Director, US Biochar Initiative)

A Final Word (for now)

The pallet story is only now starting to be written, and I will likely take this up in future writings. In this way, other industries interested in pursuing carbon financing can use the learnings here as an example of how to integrate carbon removal into their everyday business practices. For by doing so, I believe that the practice of removing excess carbon dioxide from the sky by any method can reach new heights.

More to come – onwards!

Many thanks to the NWPCA for hosting an excellent event, to Jess Bonsall at 48forty Solutions, Miles Murray and Matt “Petey” Peterson at LOCOALfor the site tour, and Kat Vasquez from Oxnard Pallets (an AirMiners BootUp graduate!) for making the many, many introductions to the wooden pallet community.

Jason Grillo is the Principal of Earthlight Enterprises marketing and carbon finance consultancy, Co-Founded AirMiners, and is a voluntary contributor to CDR.FYI. The opinions expressed in this writing are the author’s own and do not reflect the position of any employer, client, or associated organization. This post also appears on the blog of the Institute for Responsible Carbon Removal.

1NAICS code 321920

2HHI value of 88.1 in 2022, per census.gov

3Source: NWPCA: https://www.palletcentral.com/page/LandfillAvoidance, assuming average of 40lbs per wooden pallet

4Disclosure: I am a voluntary contributor to CDR.FYI

5For an analysis of conditions of eligibility for 48E, see this from PWC: https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/tax/library/pwc-final-regulations-clarify-rules-for-section-48-tax-credit.html#:~:text=The%20proposed%20and%20final%20regulations%20define%20qualified%20biogas%20property%20as,that%20is%20qualified%20biogas%20property.

Welcome to Keeling’s Descent with Ryan Davidson

KD #1: We can only scale carbon removal to relevant levels if we emphasize its economic benefits over its climate benefits.


I used to think carbon removal was a distraction from “real” climate action.

Like too many people working in decarbonization, I thought it was a red herring in the hunt for a sustainable future, a moral hazard enabling us (not just oil companies, but everyone) to continue emitting CO2 and other greenhouse gases.

I’ll come straight out and tell you that I no longer believe those things.

My name is Ryan Davidson, and for my full-time job, I’ve worked for a wave energy technology developer on business development, policy advocacy, and communications, among other things, since 2021. After a few years working on emission reductions, though, I realized reductions alone wouldn’t be enough to slow climate change to a halt. I understand I’m preaching to the choir here, but in spring 2024 it hit me just how vital removals will be, too.

I started learning about carbon removal in my free time in mid-2024, mulling over what my personal philosophy on the topic might be. I completed the AirMiners Boot Up program last fall (shoutout to AirMiners co-founder, and fellow IRCR contributor, Jason Grillo). During and after that time I met folks working in all corners of the CDR ecosystem who were kind enough to offer me their time and wisdom.

Semi-confident in my understanding of the vast world of CDR, last November, I started committing my thoughts to writing  in Renaissance Carbon, a weekly Substack on the tech, politics, and culture of all things carbon removal. One of my main points – perhaps the main point – has been that we can only scale carbon removal to relevant levels if we emphasize its economic benefits over its climate benefits. While this has been (and will continue to be) especially true during the second Trump administration, I believe the point stands regardless of who occupies the White House.

One of my first Renaissance Carbon posts included a “10 Commandments of CDR.” We live in a different world now than in late 2024, but I believe the Commandments still generally hold:

    1. Thou shalt not focus too much on DAC.
    2. Thou shalt not cast stones at DAC, either.
    3. Thou shalt emphasize CDR methods with viable revenue streams beyond CDR.
    4. Thou shalt not rely upon the voluntary carbon market to build a gigaton-scale CDR industry.
    5. Thou shalt not forget about lifecycle emissions.
    6. Thou shalt not compare CDR to waste management.
    7. Thou shalt not mistake CCUS for CDR.
    8. Honor thy market-pull mechanisms.
    9. Honor thy subnational policy mechanisms.
    10. Thou shalt not covet funding for emissions reductions.

My CDR beliefs have evolved over the past nine months, but I wouldn’t change much about this list. If I were to change anything, I’d reword Number 4 and add an 11th one somewhere: CDR is not an industry at all. I’m highly confident in this statement for several reasons:

    1. Lots of CDR methods are only similar to each other in that they each happen to remove CO2from the atmosphere.
    2. If we consider carbon removal an industry, the failure or scandal of one company could poison the well for other companies that are in no way similar.
    3. Just as carbon emissions are a negative externality, carbon removals are a positive externality. “Carbon emissions” isn’t an industry, so carbon removal isn’t either.
    4. Bunching together a variety of seemingly different climate technologies and processes and calling the aggregate an “industry” shines a spotlight on one of the biggest things we don’t want to put in the spotlight: the fact that we’d support projects primarily for their climate benefits to begin with. Whether you like it or not, the economic argument must take precedent.

Individual CDR methods like direct air capture and biochar may be industries, and even MRV may be its own industry, but bundling the entire CDR ecosystem together and acting like it’s a cohesive industry will do us more harm than good. Throughout 2025, I’ve added additional pillars to my CDR philosophy. Here are a few of them:

    • CDR is not about “degrowth.” The Abundance discussion, spurred by the New York Times bestseller from Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson, is a bit too simple, unstructured, and, in my opinion, optimistic. But what Klein and Thompson get right is that we won’t scale low- and negative-emissions infrastructure with the same stringent regulations in place that strangle infrastructure development today.
    • CDR can help bolster national security if we want it to . As one example, manufacturing negative-emission materials may allow us to build a domestic circular economy and reduce our reliance upon imports. As another example, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) can remove CO2 from the atmosphere and provide baseload power to the grid, all the while supporting local feedstock providers and decoupling the domestic economy from global supply chains.
    • There are no silver bullets in addressing climate change. Within the world of carbon removal, perhaps the biggest violation here comes from unrelenting proponents of ocean iron fertilization. When we give any solution the silver bullet treatment, we implicitly decide that its benefits outweigh its risks. Sometimes, I fear we lose the forest for the trees. Or in the case of OIF, I guess we lose the algae bloom for the plankton.

One of the most rewarding parts of writing Renaissance Carbon is learning lessons like these. I’ll continue writing Renaissance Carbon, which I’ve recently expanded to cover a broader range of carbon-related topics than just carbon removal. This publication with the Institute for Responsible Carbon Removal, however, will focus exclusively on CDR.

I thought for a while about what to call this publication. I decided on “Keeling’s Descent” because that’s exactly the long-term goal of the CDR ecosystem: to not only flatten the Keeling Curve, but to force it downward. Before the Industrial Revolution, atmospheric CO2 levels sat at around 280 parts per million (ppm). Now they’re at 424 ppm, representing a human-caused increase of 51 percent. Don’t get me wrong; we’re much more than 51 percent better off now than we were before the Industrial Revolution. But at some point, our increased well-being will plateau while emissions and their associated negative impacts continue to expand. Given the quantum leaps we’ve seen in clean energy technologies over the past couple of decades, I’m inclined to believe that point is now.

Charles David Keeling, a scientist at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, started collecting atmospheric CO2 readings at the Mauna Loa Observatory in 1958. The saw-toothed upward-ticking graph has become one of the most iconic visuals in climate science. Graphic courtesy of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography.

Achieving net-zero emissions globally by 2050 would imply that the curve will flatten out within the next 25 years. I hate to say it, but this feels like a pipedream. The curve won’t trend downward for a very long time; I’d give it at least three decades, and even that might be aggressively optimistic. I am optimistic that it will someday happen, though.

On this note, I’ll offer a disclaimer. I’m not going to use this platform to paint a rosy picture of the future or push crackpot proposals that will magically help us remove 10 billion tons of CO2 from the atmosphere each year. I consider myself a climate optimist, but optimism without realism is nothing short of insanity. I may discuss uncomfortable topics, and we will face all too many inconvenient truths in the years to come. One example: Oil and gas companies will play a huge role in scaling CDR. Do they see it as a hall pass to continue producing fossil fuels? Maybe. Do they see it as a way to stay relevant? Absolutely. But does that even matter?

Finally, at the end of each Keeling’s Descent post, I’ll drop the latest CO2 reading from the Scripps Institution of Oceanography. In the summer months, this number will fall because the growth of land-based vegetation in the Northern Hemisphere outweighs human-caused CO2 emissions. In the fall, winter, and spring months, this number will rise as biologic sinks (and humanity, of course) release their CO2 back into the atmosphere.

Nobody knows when (or even if) the Keeling Curve will reach an apex.

But when (or if) it does, let’s be ready to pull the curve downward while building our economy upward.

Latest CO2 reading: 423.84 ppm

Ryan Davidson is a business development and policy specialist in the U.S. marine energy sector, and in his free time he writes Renaissance Carbon, a weekly Substack about the tech, politics, and culture of all things carbon. The opinions expressed in Keeling’s Descent are his own and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of any employer.

Contact: ryandavidson911@gmail.com

CDR Industry Culture to Withstand a US Climate Policy Superstorm – Climagination with Jason Grillo

… And what ‘Fight Club’ can teach us


Greetings again after I took the summer off from writing! Here’s something lost in the discourse surrounding the One Big Beautiful Bill and its dire consequences for climate movement in the United States: the much-coveted 45Q tax credits remain intact. In fact for CCS purposes the value per ton of those credits increased to be at parity with DAC credits. Despite the many setbacks the climate movement saw in the OBBB passage, carbon dioxide removal seems to have escaped the worst of outcomes. Begs the question: why?

I’m not going to rehash the politics of how and why the OBBB itself came to pass. Rather, in this piece I’m going to explore some upstream reasons why I believe that carbon dioxide removal was spared the worst, with culture as a primary driver.  To be clear: I believe the bill’s repercussions for many climate solutions – especially the wind, solar, and electric vehicle industries – will hamper economic growth and climate progress. Think of this writing more as an opinion essay rather than a data-driven argument, drawing on experience as an entrepreneur, policy advocate, and community organizer.

There’s an adage that politics is downstream of culture. So it would follow that carbon removal culture is part of the reason that CDR has to date enjoyed downstream political support in the USA, . The nature of the industry and the policy advocacy efforts by many, many dedicated individuals to this point in time has provided something that regulators, civil servants, elected officials – and their constituents – can get behind, on both Left and Right, in conservative or liberal contexts.

Here are some of my observations on the advantages that CDR achieves in its general industry culture:

1 – Carbon removal represents a new type of climate solution, famously thrust into the spotlight in 2018 with the IPCC statement that removing excess atmospheric CO2 is going to be necessary to achieve the world’s climate targets. Being new has spared CDR from excess baggage of decades of fighting over environmental policy. This offers a contrast to renewable energy, or EVs which are making headway significantly now, but only after decades of opposition and foot-dragging.¹

Furthermore, the novelty of CDR is not in stopping emissions, but targeting what is existing in the atmosphere already – which makes for a different framing of climate solution. In short, there’s no incumbent industry that is going to resist the threat of being displaced!

2 – Because CDR features many different technological approaches, the industry as a whole can offer a diverse set of co-benefits to a wide variety of stakeholders beyond the all-important ton of atmospheric carbon dioxide removed. In other words, while industry insider participants may contend adamantly about advantages and drawbacks of particular CDR methods, there’s enough benefits to serve the additional needs of many interested parties. CDR is not biochar alone, Direct Air Capture alone, or BECCS alone – it is a set of widely varying solutions centered around one central problem.

3 – Third, branding. Excess atmospheric carbon dioxide is legally characterized as pollution as of the 2007 Massachusetts vs EPA Supreme Court decision. And pollution = bad. As such, the carbon removal industry strives to clean up this big carbon spill in the sky² – and do so in a way that does not threaten incumbent industries. And in doing so consider the non-climate aspects of a CDR solution – a climate solution which does not talk about climate per se, similar to how the first rule of ‘Fight Club’ is to “not talk about Fight Club”.

A corollary: Transforming a pollutant into a product that can provide value to a customer turns the climate conversation on its head. It tickles the imagination to think that a ‘bad’ can become a ‘good’. I’m particularly fond of the Reversing Climate Change podcast not just because of the content, but because of the mindset that leads us to think that reversing the worst of climate change is possible – it suggests agency rather than passivity.

These factors make conversations about carbon removal easy to enter into. The ‘ask’ in carbon removal is not so much asking people to change their lifestyles – that can lead to resistance. Rather to seek support for forward thinking solutions that truly tickle the imagination. To wit, anecdotally I’ll say that I’ve had many conversations with family, friends, and friends of friends about carbon removal, and I frequently hear:

“You can do that? Really??”

“Yes, really. We can turn a waste pollutant into a product or service of value.”

And when I tell people that if we stop emitting CO2 first and foremost, while scaling up carbon removal, then we can draw down the 425ppm of carbon dioxide³ to preindustrial levels over the course of decades, I get the same response: 

“This is possible? Really?” 

Yes. It. Is. Possible. 

This framing imbues the industry with a message of hope, which has enabled CDR (to date) to sidestep the culture wars that have led many climate solutions to fall victim to pitched on-again / off-again battles in the United States, depending on the whims of 2 or 4 year election cycles. A positive culture emerged from a blank slate, offering potential economic benefits while moving forward on a narrative of hope.4

I firmly believe we need an “all of the above” strategy for climate solutions – no one solution set alone is enough. Threading the needle of culture can lead to policy success downstream; some sectors of climate solutions have succeeded at that better than others. Carbon dioxide’s ability to avoid the worst of climate culture wars to date has to be considered a success in the early stages of the industry.

Jason Grillo is the Principal of Earthlight Enterprises marketing consultancy, Co-Founded AirMiners, and is a voluntary contributor to CDR.FYI. This post appeared on the Institute for Responsible Carbon Removal blog

The opinions expressed in this writing are each author’s own and do not reflect the position of any employer or associated organization.

¹See GM’s EV1 which was on the US market from 1996 to 1999 

²Hat tip to Mike Robinson at Pacific Coast Legacy Emissions Action Network (PACCLEAN.org) for this metaphor

³As of August 2, 2025, per https://www.co2.earth/daily-co2

4And “hope is a good thing – maybe the best of things

 

Can Contracts for Difference be the ‘superhero’ of durable CDR? – Climagination with Jason Grillo and Isaac de Leon

Image: iStock, cyano66

CfDs have worked in other markets; they just might work for durable carbon dioxide removal.


As momentum builds around durable carbon removal, one assumption keeps resurfacing: that compliance markets will eventually unlock the scale and stability the voluntary markets have failed to deliver. What we are missing is a bridge that establishes price certainty today while preparing CDR developers to compete in tomorrow’s compliance landscape.

One of the most effective financing tools may already be in our policy toolkit: Contracts for Difference (CfD). Borrowed from the renewable energy industry, CfDs could offer carbon removal the market infrastructure it needs to scale by guaranteeing a specific price, thus catalyzing investment and enabling long term planning.

To start, let’s define what a CfD is.

CfDs are one of the clearest examples of smart public-private risk-sharing, and are used widely already in a different industry: energy. Contracts for difference have become a key market mechanism for scaling low carbon power (specially solar and wind) since its inception in 2014 in the United Kingdom. At its core a CfD guarantees a fixed price (Strike Price) for electricity over a long term (15 years in the UK). If the Wholesale market price (Reference Price) falls below this Strike Price the government pays the project operator the difference. If the Reference Price exceeds the Strike Price then the generator must pay back the excess to the government (Claw Back Mechanism).

Here’s a quick illustration, from a report by the Bipartisan Policy Center:

Source: Bipartisan Policy Center

In the energy sector, this structure offers electricity generators a  secure, predictable revenue stream while ensuring the “public” or rate payers recoup gains when prices are high. In doing so, the CfD evolved from a simple subsidy into a risk sharing financial hedge.

Why did the renewable energy industry adopt CfDs?

In the energy industry, risk defines value. Who carries it, who mitigates it, and who gets paid to take it.

The industry realized that one of the most effective instruments seen for rebalancing risk between public and private actors (without distorting the markets) is the CfD.

At its core, a CfD is a long-term financial contract that stabilizes revenue for power generators by hedging against market price volatility. But beyond the pricing mechanism lies its strategic importance: CfDs allocate risk to the party best positioned to manage it. Governments absorb short-term market volatility while developers retain responsibility for construction, performance, and resource variability.

It’s a clean split. And it works.

For governments, this isn’t just a subsidy: it’s a market signal, a risk management tool, and – in some cases – a revenue-generating hedge. Current CfD structures are designed to require the project operator to pay back any revenue it earns above the agreed strike price, allowing governments to claw back¹ the upside and when prices collapse, they guarantee the floor that makes projects bankable. The result is a scalable, fiscally responsible way to accelerate investment in critical infrastructure that can be applied to offshore wind, solar, or carbon removal.

How CfDs enabled renewables to scale

Before CfDs, intermittent renewable energy (offshore wind and solar) struggled under volatile wholesale markets. These projects were capital intensive and had unpredictable revenue. Enter CfDs, by absorbing price risk governments created the financial certainty that developers needed to build large scale infrastructure and commit to large scale projects. 

Between 2015 and 2022, UK offshore wind saw a steep cost curve decline:

 

Source: Energy Transitions Commission

Developers responded by delivering massive capacity at ever-lower prices. For instance, the world’s largest offshore wind farm, Dogger Bank, secured its CfD in 2019 and achieved financial close soon after, clearing the path for a £9 billion project that began generating power in 2023.

By providing revenue stability, CfDs unlocked unprecedented levels of private investment, accelerating deployment and reducing clean energy costs in tandem.

The power of the two-way CfD lies in how it allocates risk between public agencies and private developers:

    • Price risk: the wild swings in wholesale electricity prices is transferred to the public sector, which funds or collects payments. This insulation grants generators the confidence to plan and build.
    • Volume and delivery risk related to actual performance, weather, and construction timelines remains fully with the developers, incentivizing them to manage and operate efficiently.
    • Upside returns when markets boom are recaptured by consumers or taxpayers, thanks to the clawback mechanism. Meanwhile, developers receive a stable, long‑term income regardless of market volatility .

Why this could work in Carbon Dioxide Removal 

Much like renewable energy in its early days, durable carbon dioxide removal (CDR) today is trapped by three interlocking market failures: high upfront costs, no long-term price certainty, and limited bankability.

Removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere is a critical component of any credible pathway to net zero; however, despite growing recognition of its importance, the market for durable CDR has not grown as much as needed to achieve climate goals. The problem doesn’t seem to be its technological potential, but rather, it’s a gap in the economic structure. 

Developers face significant capital expenditures long before they can deliver a single tonne of removed CO₂. Outside commitment to substantial infrastructure investment is in many cases necessary upfront, with payback periods that are uncertain and years away. This happened already in the early challenges of offshore wind and utility-scale solar, which struggled to attract financing without predictable revenue streams.

At the same time, today’s CDR buyers (mostly voluntary corporate purchasers) offer no consistent long-term price signal. Carbon credit prices are fragmented and obscure, negotiations are bespoke, and there is a need for long term offtake agreements beyond a few years to support deep project financing. In this environment, even the most promising technologies remain non-bankable. Without a clear price floor or guaranteed demand, developers can’t raise debt, and equity investors face too much risk to deploy capital at scale.

Renewable energy broke through this impasse with the introduction of long-term contracts, in the form of CfDs. These contracts restructured risk: governments absorbed market price volatility, while developers retained delivery risk. By guaranteeing a fixed price for electricity for 15-20 years , CfDs enabled governments to shift market risks away from developers and unlock billions in private capital. This single innovation transformed renewables from speculative ventures into investable infrastructure. Today, CDR needs the same financial infrastructure.

CfDs for CDR can provide developers with the revenue stability needed to raise financing and commit to long term investment. And by anchoring demand though public procurement governments can send the same kind of credible signals that were so catalytic for renewable energy markets around the world.

The goal is simple: crowd in capital for durable CDR methods (DAC, BECCS, etc) by de-risking future cash flow and aggregating long-term demand. Furthermore, the promise of CfD contracts on the horizon would signify that carbon removal companies have staying power for the long term and thus encourage voluntary market buyers to purchase in the near term.

Project stakeholders would see benefits from the de-risking of durable CDR projects:

  • Project developers want to be able to forecast price certainty going forward so that they can build out their revenue models and self-finance their expansion. For biochar developers, they would need this to purchase new pyrolysis equipment and expand their operations. For ERW, growing their feedstock and grinding operations would be needed, while DAC and BECCS players could use CfDs to achieve project financing to build new facilities.
  • For governments, this achieves several purposes: a growing industry safeguarded by price through which they can expand their tax base. And it also enables them to hit a current (or future) carbon removal target on the pathway to achieving net zero emissions in their jurisdiction. To say nothing of the environmental or economic co-benefits from CDR projects.
  • Investors especially would like to see this. To date, equity financing for carbon removal has been the majority of funding announced. As the industry matures, more stable carbon credit pricing and predictable revenue would be necessary to unlock debt and project financing.

How a CfD Auction could potentially work in CDR

In the UK, Contracts for Difference are awarded through competitive auctions:

Auction Administrator: the National Grid Electricity System Operator (ESO) is responsible for running the competitive auctions for Contracts for Difference (CfD). This includes pre-qualification, bid assessment, and notifying winners.

Contract Party: The Low Carbon Contracts Company (LCCC), a government-owned company, acts as the contractual party to the awarded contracts. It manages contract execution and makes (or receives) payments after projects become operational.

Policy Framework: The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) sets the overall policy and parameters for the auctions, including budget for each allocation round.

The auction:

    • Renewable energy developers submit bids specifying the lowest price at which they are willing to supply electricity over the contract term.
    • The government awards CfD to developers who offer the most competitive (lowest) strike prices.
    • Payments Mechanism: once operational, projects:
      • Receive top-up payments when the wholesale market price of electricity (typically the UK day-ahead market price) is lower than the strike price; or
      • Pay back the difference if the market price is higher than the strike price.
      • This mechanism allows excess profits to be returned to the public


Integration with Emissions trading systems

Not many emissions trading systems offer pricing that would support durable CDR projects at the time of this writing. As mentioned in the Philip Lee primer on CDR integration with emissions trading systems, the critical point is to index at a strike price below the Emissions Trading System (ETS) price per ton. 

This mechanism provides incentive for project developers to lower costs, else reimburse the government for their price per ton. Governments would be incentivized to help with lowering the cost of financing for projects to achieve that lower price per ton as well – else the private financial backers may not enter into an agreement with the project developer to begin with and hence not provide any additional revenue to the government. The question becomes: at what credit price per ton would a financier find high enough in a strike price to ensure a sufficient Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for their own purposes.

What can CDR companies do today to advance the use of contracts for difference?

  1. Work with a relevant governing body to create a CfD reverse auction, using industry best standards for quality (e.g. private registries, EU CRCF, ICVCM CCP, etc)
  2. Get clear on what an acceptable carbon removal credit strike price would ensure profitability of operations, considering the CfD could be a long term contract backed by a government to unlock project development financing.
  3. Start mapping CfD cost benchmarks by CDR method on to provide to potential auctioneers to execute an auction by different CDR method type.
  4. Begin mapping for infrastructure – renewable energy, transportation, storage siting – that would support long term government contracting for large volumes of CDR tonnage.

Setting up these structures by 2030 would be crucial to unlock the promise of compliance markets to achieve carbon removal at high volume.

Isaac de Leon is a lawyer with over 15 years of experience negotiating energy and infrastructure deals across Latin America and Europe. After a career in oil & gas, he now helps shape the future of carbon removal, advising on legal structures, offtake agreements, and policies that unlock climate finance for the Global South. 

Jason Grillo is the Principal of Earthlight Enterprises marketing consultancy, Co-Founded AirMiners, and is a voluntary contributor to CDR.FYI. This post appeared on the Institute for Responsible Carbon Removal blog

The opinions expressed in this writing are each author’s own and do not reflect the position of any employer or associated organization.

¹A contractual feature in two-way CfDs that requires the seller to return any revenues earned above the agreed strike price. When market prices exceed the strike, the generator repays the difference, this locks in predictable returns for investors while protecting public funds from overcompensating projects. This mechanism turns CfDs into symmetric risk-sharing tools rather than one-sided subsidies.

In Carbon We Trust – Climagination with Jason Grillo

Markets move at the speed of trust. Durable carbon removal needs to create more of it to attract new customers and accelerate the market. 


Hey folks, glad you made it here!

I’m going to say a quiet part out loud: if a customer doesn’t buy from you, it’s because they don’t trust you to deliver value for them for the price, relative to other options.

As it is still a young industry, carbon removal struggles with finding new customers; in a new market, and new offering, to a new customer who has never purchased the class of product before, trust is crucial. “New” can generate attention, but “trust” makes business happen, and carbon removal project developers  – and the intermediaries they work with – have to overcome many, many barriers to earn that trust. 

This operates on three levels:

  1. Enticing customers to trust the class of product or service 
  2. Reaching mutual understanding of terms that the customer trusts under a contract
  3. Demonstrating operational credibility to deliver based on that agreement

I want to talk about how the market for durable carbon removal can advance through reducing risks and making trust happen. 

Symptoms

The chart presented here at Carbon Unbound East Coast from Alexander Rink at CDR.FYI¹ shows the problem: a slowing rate of new customers entering the market to purchase credits, with more than 70% of the purchase volume from Microsoft alone.

Durable CDR is running out of early adopters and has not yet broken through to a different group of more mainstream customers – who have a lower risk tolerance and are less likely to trust novel methods to achieve their business goals.

Bluntly, this represents a failure to achieve trust among new customers who have never purchased durable carbon removal credits.

Digging deeper, the story is a bit more nuanced. Operational credibility (#3 above) is there: Microsoft purchases that are breaking through with large multimillion ton deals by large scale project developers, who have resources to execute well using carbon removal technologies that are well understood such as BECCS and biochar. Considering the agreements strictly within durable CDR, this is low risk / high trust.

For both Microsoft and non-Microsoft customers, volumes per purchase are increasing – showing that yes they trust that the carbon removal works well if they have purchased already.

Beyond Microsoft and the Frontier group of companies, customers who have never purchased carbon removal are not seeing value for the price required by suppliers, even when factoring in co-benefit narratives. “No sale” is more trustworthy than a purchase. Not that new customers necessarily believe that any particular project might fail – I don’t believe that trust is absent, there’s just not enough of it for a new customer to address their own business risks. For sustainability managers with limited internal political capital, their trust is best placed in projects outside of carbon removal, or even outside of offsets generally, or with inaction.

Even in setting a Net Zero target, the unknowns for any future technology are a challenge, as suggested in this chart from SBTi:

Though this data is from March of 2024, in 2025 placing trust for new technologies is even more difficult in a macroeconomic environment that today is rife with uncertainties.

For existing CDR customers: Continue to improve trust in CDR

Right now the remedy for a lack of trust are a host of diligence exercises at the project by project level. Registries, marketplaces, insurance, ratings agencies, and external consultants hired by purchasers all will look at a project before final signatures go on paper. To say nothing of legal teams who would review new types of contracts covering a new class of credit.

I’m *not* arguing that we should throw these diligence activities out the window at all: they are necessary to build trust for those who already want to pursue a carbon removal purchase. But as the current best practice for trustbuilding, their existence represents table stakes for transactions to occur for those who are interested in going forward, however aren’t inspiring more new customers to place their trust in durable CDR.

This establishes a good baseline of trust at the level of convincing those who are interested to begin with to trust that a project is credible.

Prospective customers: Increase trust to purchase 

My recommendation: look to higher systemic activities that fit into existing frameworks for new customers. We know from a survey of sustainability professionals by Verdantix that firms do not pay much of a financial penalty for missing net-zero targets, and that the chief risk is reputational.

Source: Verdantix , “From Targets To Action: Delivering On Net Zero Commitments”

So lean into ways that enable a customer to build reputational credibility in durable carbon removal as a class of product.

  • First, gain acceptance of CDR methodologies among standards bodies who evaluate registries. Based on data from the Patch marketplace, the most influential is the Core Carbon Principles approval, from the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market, which has started to apply the CCP label to millions of issued credits.

  • Second: Encourage formal forums or informal peer-to-peer experience sharing among potential customers. Sustainability professionals speak with each other, yet networks of people who have made purchases of carbon removal represent an untapped resource. This would take place in the context of a broader offset conversation where durable carbon removals are a specific class of offset. Decision makers may or may not trust CDR suppliers, or if they do, it’s after many rounds of diligence. 

Fence sitters are more likely to become interested in durable CDR if a colleague can vouch for the practice in the first place. Formal or informal connections among sustainability offices can create social proof among trusted peer sets for best practices – building trust in durable carbon removal.

The need is especially acute for sharing how to work with corporate procurement teams, financial leadership, and legal departments surrounding contracting. Bespoke contracts lead to bespoke contracts; systematizing standard forms of contracting for durable carbon removal leads to trust.

  • Third: Find a way to deliver business value beyond carbon removal. This opens up another avenue to build trust: yes the sustainability claim, but showing a return on investment more clearly. This came through clearly in the CDR.FYI / Sylvera market survey of potential purchasers:
Source: CDR.FYI “In Net Zero Standards We Trust – 2025 CDR Market Survey”

Conclusion, and Prognosis

I believe that the problems behind carbon removal markets are solvable, by employing new methods of winning trust among new customers. Today, gaining trust takes a great deal of effort on behalf of carbon removal suppliers, such that fewer new purchaser organizations are coming to CDR relative to previous years. Third party standards, peer networks among fence-sitting purchasers, standard contracting, and greater publication of successes are ways to improve credibility of CDR and make markets expand.

 

Jason Grillo is the Principal of Earthlight Enterprises marketing consultancy, Co-Founded AirMiners, and is a voluntary contributor to CDR.FYI. The opinions expressed in this writing are the author’s own and do not reflect the position of any employer or associated organization.

¹ Thanks to Alex Rink and my voluntary contributor colleagues at CDR.FYI for their work on the presentation. To request the full presentation, see this link here

Methane and Super Pollutants: A New Pillar to Support Carbon Markets – Climagination with Jason Grillo

Photo by Vincent M.A. Janssen, Pexels

Methane and Super Pollutants: A New Pillar to Support Carbon Markets

Controlling super pollutant emissions can have a rapid, outsized impact on climate change, while offering high quality carbon credits. Markets are taking notice.


Hello once more, and thank you for reading!

Good things often come in fours – the ancient Greeks believed in four elements of earth, air, fire, and water; The Three Musketeers had Athos, Porthos, Aramis, and D’Artagnan; and the Beatles were a (Fab) Four.

The same can be true for carbon markets. To date voluntary and compliance sectors have stood on three major pillars of credit classes: avoidance (including RECs and REDD+), nature based solutions, and durable carbon dioxide removal.

Today I’m going to provide an overview on what I believe to be the fourth ‘pillar’ of carbon markets: methane and super pollutant elimination credits. Controlling emissions of these non-CO2 gases are crucially important for shaving off near-term temperature increases as they have an outsized impact on global warming relative to CO2. While I’m going to synthesize from a wide variety of sources, most of my focus will be on methane as the super pollutant most responsible for warming to date.

This is not to say that we don’t need crediting for CO2 – rather that a portfolio approach that includes the all important “e” in CO2e for ‘equivalent’, which can change the shape of carbon markets and provide an important tool for supporting climate action.

Here’s three questions I’m going to address briefly:

    1. Why are Super Pollutants so important?
    2. How are solutions for them created today?
    3. What makes this new category ‘real’ in carbon markets?

Why are Methane and Super Pollutants so important?

Methane, nitrous oxide, and ozone depleting fluorocarbons account for a significant portion of climate change forcing that we are experiencing today. Methane emissions are responsible for about 30% of recent warming , and nitrous oxide has caused about 10% of warming.

Even though super pollutant concentrations are much lower than CO2 in the atmosphere (e.g. methane is at around ~2ppm vs CO2’s 420ppm), super pollutant gases have a high global warming potential as measured over a 100 year time period relative to CO2:

Chart from Ghgprotocol.org

Eliminating these emissions are a huge opportunity for impactful climate action to manage as outlined in the US National Academy of Science Engineering and Math report in 2024. Targeting non-CO2 greenhouse gases can shave off significant risks from climate change before 2050:

Source: NASEM, 2024

The speed of change by managing methane emissions is striking. Because the CH4 molecule is active and unstable, it breaks down within 15 years – so stopping emissions now could lead to a rapid decline in atmospheric concentrations. To use the famous ‘bathtub’ metaphor, it’s not just that stopping water entering the tub means that the water doesn’t rise anymore: it means that the excess water (i.e. ambient atmospheric methane) will disappear in a fraction of the time relative to CO2.

The result, per Dr. Gabriel Dreyfus et al:

“non-CO2 targeted measures when combined with decarbonization can provide net cooling by 2030 and reduce the rate of warming from 2030 to 2050 by about 50%, roughly half of which comes from methane”

In other words, we can slow down global warming by focusing activity on methane and other non-CO2 super pollutants.

Source: NASEM 2024

How do we create solutions for Super Pollutants?

To start, the atmospheric science community is advancing rapidly to pinpoint hotspots now visible through satellite imagery or other detection solutions. Turning off these excess emission sources at the metaphorical spigot enables businesses to generate emissions avoidance credits. Destroying these gases as well is a credit generating project.

Considering methane, major emission sources include but are not exclusively:

    • Oil and Gas extraction, transport, and distribution
    • Livestock enteric methane emissions
    • Landfill emissions
    • Wastewater processing emissions
    • Agricultural emissions, particularly rice farming
    • Permafrost emissions
    • Wetland emissions

Businesses are springing up to develop solutions for reducing Super Pollutant emissions, building revenue streams on emissions mitigation or destruction credits. Crediting mechanisms for these activities are coming online as well, especially as new projects deploy to manage the different classes of super pollutants.

Note: Methane credits today are emission avoidance credits. While the prospect of ambient methane removal is quite exciting, the technology may be many years away from field deployment and commercialization at the time of this writing.

In the voluntary carbon market, several crediting methodologies are in place already, and their registries have been issuing credits. Projects for landfill methane emissions have been in existence for several years, using Climate Action Reserve and Verra for methane management crediting based on activities with landfills, livestock, and coal mines.

Other registries and registry endorsing bodies are taking notice as well, with American Carbon Registry and the International Carbon Registry (ICR) creating methodologies for capping orphaned, abandoned, or marginally producing oil and gas wells – noting that ICROA granted unconditional endorsement to ICR in January 2025. Furthermore, in June 2024, the Integrity Council for Voluntary Carbon Markets approved using the Core Carbon Principle label on 27 million issued methane and ozone-depleting substance destruction credits. These quality labels are crucial for establishing trust in the credits and projects that they issue from.

For nitrous oxide, 40% of emissions are from human activities, primarily from agriculture, per the IPCC, so efforts at stopping emissions in that economic sector would be a path forward – enough to warrant a methodology for crediting nitrous oxide photocatalysis.

Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS) such as CFCs and HCFCs typically come from leaking older refrigerant systems. Collecting and destroying these containers to create carbon credits is painstaking project work, but which offers financial incentives to build a business.

Beyond voluntary markets, compliance markets have protocols as well for projects that collect and destroy Ozone Depleting Substances, with projects generating credits that have been traded systems in California and Washington State. Based on voluntary market price points for non-CO2 credits (more on this shortly), these credits trade at or below Washington and California compliance market clearing prices¹, as well as below UK and EU ETS prices at the time of this writing.²

What makes the Super Pollutant opportunity real for carbon markets?

Several factors are key drivers, including price, co-benefits profile, and third-party rated quality measures.

Price points. These projects are coming into the market at a price that is within the range conducive to adoption in voluntary and compliance markets. The table below that summarizes the four major pillars, with price points, supplied by Robert Cheesewright and Tom Fallows at Pinwheel:

The price point of the ‘second generation avoidance’ credits stands out, sitting between first generation avoidance and higher priced durable carbon removal, and roughly at the same level as Nature-based solutions. Considering strictly price and quantity of credits, this price point would suggest that methane and super pollutant projects would be able to command the same transaction volume as large quantity nature based projects. In fact, there are some hints at this already with Guacolda Energia retiring 2.3 million methane credits in February 2025.

Co-Benefits. The co-benefits narrative behind methane and super pollutant credits are more challenging to tell in comparison to more compelling stories surrounding other types of credit projects. Put bluntly, nature-based, carbon removal, REDD+ or REC credit projects have found an easier time to weave their story into ESG reporting and speak to the community story behind projects. Qualitatively, as noted by Calyx Global ratings, methane and Super Pollutant credits are not as ‘charismatic’ as many other classes of credits, and as such may be undervalued by carbon markets.

Credit Quality. Building on the co-benefits stories, Calyx notes that these ‘uncharismatic’ super pollutant projects tend to have a higher credit rating than their more ‘charismatic’ counterparts:

This is not to say that ‘charismatic’ projects are bad – far from it – or that their quality ratings won’t improve – they likely will over time with more rigorous methodologies and enhanced project management practices and technologies. That said, in the current carbon market environment which is seeing a preference to quality measures, credit purchasers are demanding more Super Pollutant credits.

Market results. In light of the trends above, the methane and super pollutant credit purchases and retirements are expanding rapidly. To wit, 2024 methane credit retirement volume increased 70% over 2023. Reaching nearly 4.4 million credits in that calendar year³, methane alone representing about 2.5% of the 175 million voluntary carbon market retirements in 2024.4

This trend is continuing in 2025 as well, with Q1 non-CO2 retirements seeing the largest number of non-CO2 gas credit retirements on record per MSCI.5

The market conditions for this growth are making for a methane and super pollutant moment. The growth of retirements in voluntary markets suggests that corporates prefer highly rated quality credits at a price point approximately akin to nature-based ARR, IFM, or soil carbon credits. The advent of new technologies, new projects, new crediting methodologies and (most importantly) the endorsement of registries themselves by quality monitoring bodies is a key driver of this trend. These are reasonably priced, high quality credits, though project co-benefits outside of emissions reduction is a hindrance.

Conclusion

Methane and Super Pollutant Elimination credits are an unheralded and rapidly growing segment of the market. These projects offer clear and direct climate benefit in the near term, and are settling in at prices and volumes that suit the needs of voluntary and compliance markets. As such, they slot in nicely to a portfolio as a fourth ‘pillar’ alongside traditional avoidance offsets, nature based credits, and durable carbon removal.

My take:

    • Super pollutant emissions represent a clear and actionable, though overlooked, focus area in climate.
    • Action to reduce methane emissions in particular can lead to significant climate impact in short order.
    • Several solution pathways are in place already with more under development.
    • Carbon credit markets are expanding rapidly for these emission reducing or destroying activities.

What do you think?

Jason Grillo is the Principal of Earthlight Enterprises marketing consultancy, Co-Founded AirMiners, and is a voluntary contributor to CDR.FYI. The opinions expressed in this writing are the author’s own and do not reflect the position of any employer or associated organization.

1Washington State March 2025 auction settled at $50 per allowance, California + Quebec combined markets auction in February 2025 settled at $29.27 USD.

265 EUR/ton for the EU ETS, $47 USD/ton for UK ETS. Source: https://carboncredits.com/carbon-prices-today/ accessed April 19, 2025

3Thanks to ClimateWells for posting this data on their blog and their CEO Reid Calhoon for placing Q1 charts on LinkedIn. 

4Sylvera, The State of Carbon Credits 2024

5Posted on LinkedIn by ClimateWells CEO, Reid Calhoon, here

How CDR can cross ‘The Chasm’ (Part 2 of 2) – Climagination with Jason Grillo

Image by Pete Linforth from Pixabay

Getting to a mainstream market is possible in carbon removal; here’s some thoughts on how

“A bit of advice given to a young Native American at the time of his initiation: 

‘As you go the way of life, you will see a great chasm. 

Jump. 

It is not as wide as you think.”

― Joseph Campbell


Welcome back! I’m writing this as a companion post to Part 1 where I proposed that CDR is at a ‘chasm’ point between an early market and a more mainstream class of customer. In this post (Part 2 of 2), I will offer some suggestions on how a carbon removal project developer might make that transition. Once again, I’ll adapt key principles from Geoffrey Moore’s Crossing the Chasm to durable carbon removal, this time talking about specific actions which early stage companies can take that might yield success.

As a reminder, here is a graphic of Moore’s technology adoption lifecycle curve:

Image: https://smashfly.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/crossing-the-chas.jpg

And a shorthand reminder of the three segments most in play for CDR now: 

      1. Enthusiasts (AKA Innovators) who are most interested in technology for technology’s sake.
      2. Visionary customers who want to be the first to implement new solutions as the start of revolutionizing the way businesses operate.
      3. Pragmatists who are Mainstream customers less interested in being the first to lead, desiring lower risk products at higher volume, with more sensitivity on price.

Because these Mainstream customers are qualitatively quite different in their needs from Early Adopters, succeeding with that group is akin to bridging a marketing Chasm.

Achieving product adoption in this third, Pragmatist group requires a different set of tools compared to the first two. To that end, based on my reading of Moore’s principles here are some strategies that I have adapted to durable CDR.

A: Target a segment of customers, not a whole market. 

Moore talks a bit about finding a market larger enough to be A) financially meaningful but B) small enough that a company can achieve at least 50% of market share among those customers. Pragmatist customers are seeking ‘the market leader’ no matter what that market might be – this group might be geographically defined, or psychographically defined, but the critical point is to define a small enough segment that you can dominate while still making meaningful financial gains. 

Many companies fail by trying to define their market too broadly: “We’ll target all of forestry with our innovative CDR solution!” is, for a startup, an impossible task. Venture investors do like a 10-year ‘hockey stick’ growth curve showing how the company (and its investors) could be zillionaires…in 2037; but they also really like a startup who shows how the initial, well-defined, smaller market segment will get the company through the next 2-3 years. Defining and dominating a tiny segment of the market and getting your business started among mainstream customers in that group is a way to win.

Examples: Carbicrete is manufacturing cast concrete pieces using CO2 as a feedstock. It would be one thing if they were to target “all concrete producers” – a daunting task. Rather, they fixate on a specific starting point that would likely yield success, and then build from that initial group of customers in which the solution you provide is the dominant one.  Example 2: Goal300 is targeting Christmas Tree farms in the Pacific Northwest as customers who would apply enhanced rock weathering to soils. It’s a specific type of customer, who has a customized set of needs, but large enough to get the business started to bridge later to a more mainstream market.

Generating reference customers through word of mouth is the goal here. One mainstream Pragmatist customer will talk to other Pragmatist customers about their product experience: as they are more risk averse relative to Visionary customers, they value the assurance of having another person’s opinion on a product before buying it. Cast concrete purchasers who speak to other cast concrete purchasers. Christmas Tree farmers who talk to other Christmas Tree farmers in a particular region. 

Talk to a variety of customers in different segments when thinking through which one to target. And also listen for the needs of various internal stakeholders within that customer company (more on this coming up in Part ‘B’ below!).

A great way for such customer discovery is to attend the industry conference for that particular customer segment! Learn who they talk to, and how they relate to each other, and what their common needs are. Because insofar as a market exists, it moves at the speed of word of mouth from reference customer to reference customer, building momentum for success among the first mainstream segment to target, so that the product can get adopted by other segments after establishing itself as the market leader in that initial ‘beachhead’ segment.

B: Figure out how to satisfy three crucial stakeholder roles in your target customer. 

Those influencers within the customer entity, per Moore, are:

      1. The end-user: who uses the product you sell
      2. The technical buyer: who evaluates the qualifications of your product
      3. The economic buyer: who provides the financial resource to pay for the product

To illustrate, I’ll use the best non-climate example from my professional experience in pharmaceuticals:

      • The end-user is the patient, who uses the product to combat a disease
      • The technical buyer would be the physician prescribing the pharmaceutical, based on their expert evaluation of the attributes of the product
      • The economic buyer is the private or government insurance company – a ‘Payer’ in pharma industry terms – or in some cases the patient themself who pays for the pharmaceutical intervention.

For durable CDR companies in a voluntary carbon market, the end user could be the corporate sustainability professional who uses the carbon removal credit to report on the Net Zero goal achieved through offsetting (or insetting). The carbon removal purchase itself serves a useful purpose to that individual.

The technical evaluator could be an outside consultancy or internal group of technical people hired for the purpose of understanding the project(s) in play. Unlike pharmaceuticals, there’s no state-mandated licensure for prescribing CDR tonnage! A select few companies have large numbers of in-house technical staff who evaluate CDR projects as they come in. Most mainstream companies will not have these resources, and as such would rely on an intermediary, such as a marketplace, broker, or consultancy to provide that technical diligence. 

The economic buyer is typically the Finance department, where price for tonnage would be paramount relative to other projects that are recommended by the sustainability department – and external or internal evaluation teams. As I wrote previously, one way to convince a CFO is to demonstrate tangible economic value by pursuing the carbon removal project. Bundling the CDR credit through insetting with a physical product, or otherwise selling the physical product of carbon removing activity alongside a separate unbundled offset represents a revenue-generating prospect for the CDR company who can sell a physical product while removing excess atmospheric greenhouse gas. Note that there are many different types of projects, and not just offset projects, that the end-users and technical buyers would recommend. So valorizing the ROI is a pathway to be persuasive to the economic buyer audience, per CDR.FYI’s 2025 Market Survey

C. Market the whole product, not just the core product

An early stage Visionary buyer typically has performance expectations for the core product itself, and is willing to forego the supportive services that would make the purchase easier to handle. Pragmatist customers’ view is the opposite: they need surrounding product or service offerings that make the purchase easy to integrate into their existing business. 

For a Pragmatic class of CDR customers this could mean: insurance services, credit ratings, or even marketing materials that enable the sustainability office to feature the project in an ESG report. 

In particular, one big concern among Pragmatist customers is that the CDR supplier will go out of business, leaving them with an unsupported amount of CDR tons that they would have to answer questions about. Demonstrating post-sale customer support and contingencies would address this risk. 

Selling a ‘whole product’ could also mean working with a broker or other intermediary who would package the durable CDR credit with other credit types, such as lower priced nature-based carbon removal, avoidance/REDD+/Renewable Energy offsets, or industrial waste gas destruction credits. That would lower the average price per ton of the entire ‘market basket’ while providing different qualities of offset to the buyer. Rather than competing for a vanishingly small attention span for CDR, the offset would be considered alongside other types of projects on offer for a Sustainability office.

So how can a CDR project developer start to make the leap?

While these three tactical suggestions could be useful for durable CDR companies to make inroads into a market of Pragmatists, the greater issue could be making the internal leap of faith required to adjust to these market forces.

The thinking surrounding pursuit of an early stage customer – heaving a technically less polished, core product over a RFP Visionary transom and, well, praying – is not a strategy that would work to gain market traction among Pragmatists. Adjusting one’s own approach to understand the mindset of the mainstream customer, respect their needs and motivations, and meeting them where they are at will be the way to success. That’s why identifying that one small niche of a Pragmatist market is so important.

Oftentimes in other industries this has meant that the visionary startup founder does not have the skills or interest to speak on equal terms to an otherwise risk-averse customer. Visionaries are great at speaking with other visionaries; pragmatists with pragmatists. So it follows that bringing in new talent to meet broader mainstream needs might have the uncomfortable task of replacing a founder for the sake of company survival.

Getting across a Chasm is not an easy task. But, a necessary one in order for an early stage company to achieve its potential. In carbon removal the results can be worldchanging, provided the durable CDR company has the right tools and, more importantly, internal mindset to adjust and make the leap. It’s a challenge to be sure but one that is possible to achieve.

Jason Grillo is the Principal of Earthlight Enterprises marketing consultancy, Co-Founded AirMiners, and is a voluntary contributor to CDR.FYI. The opinions expressed in this writing are the author’s own and do not reflect the position of any employer or associated organization.

¹Disclosure: I was a voluntary contributor to help that effort.